Psychological Aspects of Judicial Decision-Making with Particular Focus on the Evidence of Expert Opinion

Vol.28,No.1(2020)

Martina Martino Baráková

https://doi.org/10.5817/CPVP2020-1-7

PDF (Czech)
Abstract
The Decision-making process is one of the common processes in everyday life. In all decision-making situations we choose from all the available alternatives. The time needed to make a decision depends on the importance of the decision itself. Therefore, heuristics are involved in the decision making, however their utilization bring not only advantages but also threats in the form of cognitive biases. The process of judicial decision-making is comparable to the ordinary decision-making, thus, it is useful to examine it also from the psychological point of view. This article aims to summarize the variety of cognitive biases involved in decisional process. The article draw attention to the pitfalls associated with the use of heuristics in the decisional process of courts, focusing more closely on the use of evidence by expert opinion and it proposes several measures to prevent the negative aspects.

Keywords:
Decision-Making; Courts; Heuristics; Cognitive Bias; Expert Testimony.

Pages:
121–138
Author biography

Martina Martino Baráková

Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science, Faculty of Law, Masaryk University, Brno

Ph.D. student
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