Teorie principála a agenta a její využití při popisu vztahu volič–zástupce

Jaroslava Pospíšilová

Abstrakt

This review article is focused on the rising framework of principal-agent analysis in political science. It aims to map the most influential studies and answer the question of whether this concept is adequate to describe the quality of the relationship between voters and their representatives. It is obvious that using the principal-agent framework leads to oversimplification. The economic theory of democracy is not a new model; nevertheless, using the game theoretic approach requires several adjustments. The adaptation of the main premises of the concept to the political reality should open new research questions with respect to the voter–elected officials relationship. Most principal–agent studies in empirical political science are focused on all links in the delegation chain but the first one. In my opinion, the link between voters and their representatives in a democracy is the fundamental one. Describing it using the tools of principal-agent theory could help scholars better understand current changes in the structure of political parties and voter behaviour.

Bibliografická citace

Pospíšilová, J. (2017). Teorie principála a agenta a její využití při popisu vztahu volič–zástupce. Středoevropské politické studie, 19(3-4), 215-242. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/CEPSR.2017.34.215

Klíčová slova

Delegation Chain; Voters; Representatives; Principal–Agent Theory; Democracy

Plný Text:

Reference

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https://doi.org/10.5817/CEPSR.2017.34.215


Copyright (c) 2017 Jaroslava Pospíšilová

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