Constructive vote of no confidence in Czech conditions

The article focuses on current efforts of Czech government in introducing the institute of constructive vote of no confidence into the Czech parliamentary system. Despite the current proposed act not being politically viable, the general idea of enforcing the government's position has been a strong topic justifying a further analysis of the institute. The article further analyzes the proposed changes to the Constitution and attempts to predict their potential impact upon governmental stability. Main changes would include the linking of noconfidence vote to the standing government with the confidence vote to the new government and its candidate for Prime Minister. The opposition is therefore somewhat limited in its right to express no confidence to the government however it also gains an instrument enabling it to immediately form a government without the need for early elections. The constructive vote of no confidence however cannot be perceived potent enough to address all instances of government instability. In the Czech context it would be only applicable in one of the numerous instances of government crisis. The institute therefore can be perceived as a rather minor improvement of the Constitution which can none the less be beneficial in some instances. In my opinion it would therefore be advisable to pass the constructive vote of no-confidence rather as a part of a bigger Constitution amendment.