Stock Option Plans and Insider Information: Regulatory Implications and Solutions
Vol.31,No.1(2023)
The paper deals with the application impact of selected rules of capital market transparency and the protection against illegal dealing with inside information in the context of stock option programs used by issuers of financial instruments to remunerate selected persons (executive representatives and top managers of the company) in the form of enabling the acquisition of shares in the company. The goal of this paper is also the examination of specific measures enabling the balance of the requirement of equal access of all investors to market-relevant information on the one hand and the need to set up functional remuneration schemes fulfilling a motivational role on the other. It comes to the conclusion, that the investigated public law rules cannot be understood only as a factual obstacle to the use of compensations associated with the acquisition of ownership rights to shares, but also as an incentive for the parametric setting of option programs, enabling to minimize some of the negatives usually associated with this compensation tool.
Stock options plans for executives; remuneration; transparency; capital market; inside information; managers’ transactions; insider; insider dealing
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