Utilitarianism and Human Rights

Vol.28,No.3(2020)

Abstract
This paper is focused on the question of whether the concept of human rights is compatible with utilitarian ethics. First, it briefly characterizes utilitarianism and dedicates attention to some distortions and misinterpretations of this theory. It also deals with the distinction of different meanings of human rights (especially human rights as legal and moral rights). In connection with their utilitarian justification, the paper raises two key questions: 1) According to some authors, only the idea of legal rights is compatible with this ethical theory. In utilitarian context, does it make any sense to speak of human rights as a specific kind of moral rights? 2) What should we do if the violation of a human right contributes to maximizing utility? Does not such a situation force us to choose between utilitarianism and human rights? This paper shows that if we understand utilitarianism in the right way, and not in a distorted way, it provides us with satisfactory answers to both questions. In its context, human rights as certain moral rights can be understood as a part of a positive morality that would contribute most to maximizing utility. If we include all relevant factors in our considerations, we do not even have to worry that utilitarian ethics in the real world will force us to accept the problematic conclusions about the respect of these rights.


Keywords:
Utilitarianism; Jeremy Bentham; Legal and Moral Rights; Human Rights; Justification.

Pages:
321–336
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