AI-Based Decisions and Disappearance of Law
Vol.16,No.2(2022)
Yulia Razmetaeva
Natalia Satokhina
Based on the philosophical anthropology of Paul Ricoeur, the article examines, using the example of AI-based decisions, how the concept of responsibility changes under the influence of artificial intelligence, what a reverse effect this conceptual shift has on our moral experience in general, and what consequences it has for law. The problem of AI-based decisions is said to illustrate the general trend of transformation of the concept of responsibility, which consists in replacing personal responsibility with a system of collective insurance against risks and disappearing of the capacity for responsibility from the structure of our experience, which, in turn, makes justice and law impossible.
Artificial Intelligence; AI-based Decisions; Responsibility; Experience of Law; Paul Ricoeur
241 – 267
Yulia Razmetaeva
Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University
Natalia Satokhina
Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University
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