AI-Based Decisions and Disappearance of Law



Based on the philosophical anthropology of Paul Ricoeur, the article examines, using the example of AI-based decisions, how the concept of responsibility changes under the influence of artificial intelligence, what a reverse effect this conceptual shift has on our moral experience in general, and what consequences it has for law. The problem of AI-based decisions is said to illustrate the general trend of transformation of the concept of responsibility, which consists in replacing personal responsibility with a system of collective insurance against risks and disappearing of the capacity for responsibility from the structure of our experience, which, in turn, makes justice and law impossible.

Artificial Intelligence; AI-based Decisions; Responsibility; Experience of Law; Paul Ricoeur

241 – 267
Author biographies

Yulia Razmetaeva

Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University

Department of Theory and Philosophy of Law, Associate Professor

Natalia Satokhina

Yaroslav Mudryi National Law University

Department of Theory and Philosophy of Law, Associate Professor

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