

PARTICULARITIES

Cyprus Question: An Overlooked Crisis of 1964

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This year marks sixty years since the signing of the August ceasefire, which temporarily halted the bloody conflict between Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks. This contribution aims to highlight the key and often overlooked moments in the history of the Republic of Cyprus in the second half of the 20th century, which significantly influenced not only the events on the island but also international politics—both in the context of the Cold War and in the relationship between the Turkish Republic and a unified Europe¹, Greece, the USA, and not least the USSR. From a geopolitical standpoint, Cyprus was a strategic point between the USSR, the Suez Canal, and Europe, as well as an important link to the oil fields in the Persian Gulf region.² From the aforementioned, it was clear that the events of 1964 could not have escaped the attention of the key players in global affairs at that time, and thus Cyprus became yet another hot spot of the Cold War.

The genesis of the Cyprus issue, in the context of the significant deterioration of relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, can be traced back to the first half of the 1960s—a development that erupted at the end of 1963 and triggered a long-lasting crisis. At its outset, there was an attempt by then-Cypriot President Makarios³ to amend the constitution. At the end of November 1963, President

¹ The author uses the term *unified Europe* to refer to the process of European integration that began in 1952 and concluded with the establishment of the *European Union* on November 1, 1993. After November 1, 1993, the author exclusively uses the term *European Union*.

² CIA, Rustow, D. A.: *The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest*. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 3. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

³ President Makarios had previously sought foreign support for his plans, focusing primarily on Non-Aligned Movement member states, the Soviet bloc, and the USSR. He also gained the support of the Cypriot Communist Party AKEL. These developments heightened U.S. concerns about the growing Soviet influence, leading to an intensified U.S. interest in Cyprus

Makarios published 13 constitutional amendments⁴, which the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey refused to accept. The most intense reaction was provoked by the revision of the arrangements in the armed forces, police, and civil services so that they would reflect the actual division of the population, along with the abolition of the veto power of both the president and the vice president. In protest, the Turkish Cypriots left the Cypriot government and began moving into their enclaves. These constitutional changes were de facto seen as the formation of a Greek/centralized Cyprus. By December 21, 1963, it had become clear that any discussion about amending the constitution was impossible, and the situation even provoked a huge wave of violence⁵ between the two Cypriot communities.⁶

“This deadlock triggered a wave of violence between the communities and led to the departure of Turkish Cypriots from government and state positions. The Greek Cypriots saw this departure as the first step toward establishing their own administration. The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, claimed that they were forced to leave. A small British military contingent stationed in Cyprus was able to control only a limited part of the violence.”⁷

On December 24, 1963, the Greek and Turkish military units stationed on the island under the Treaty of Alliance responded to the unrest between two

and the adoption of several decisions aimed at maintaining and even strengthening NATO forces while countering Soviet influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

⁴ 1. Abolition of the presidential and vice-presidential veto power. 2. Granting the vice president full authority to represent the president during temporary absence or incapacity. 3. Modification of the election process for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives. 4. Granting the Deputy Speaker full authority to represent the Speaker in case of temporary absence or incapacity. 5. Abolition of constitutional provisions requiring a separate majority for passing laws in the House of Representatives. 6. Establishment of unified municipalities. 7. Unification of the judiciary. 8. Abolition of the division of security forces into police and gendarmerie. 9. The size of security and defence forces will be determined by law. 10. The proportion of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in public services and armed forces will be adjusted to reflect the actual population ratio by ethnic groups. 11. The number of members of the Public Service Commission will be reduced from ten to five. 12. All decisions of the Public Service Commission will be adopted by a simple majority. 13. Abolition of the Greek Communal Chamber. See more: 13 Points (30 November 1963). Available at: <https://www.pio.gov.cy/en/assets/pdf/cyproblem/13%20points.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁵ From ordinary street fights that began in late 1963 in Nicosia to a massive wave of violence that engulfed the entire island.

⁶ On December 21, 1963, a wave of violence erupted in Nicosia after Greek Cypriot police officers killed two Turkish Cypriots on the outskirts of the Turkish quarter in Nicosia. See more: UN, *Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus*. The UN Refugee Agency 2004. Available at: <https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230519073351/https://www.refworld.org/docid/469f387d1e.html> [cit. 19. 12. 2024]. Further confrontations soon followed.

⁷ UN, Special Research Report No. 3: Cyprus: New Hope after 45 Years on the Security Council Agenda.

Security Council Report. Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/research-reports/lookup-c-glkwlemtisg-b-4474149.php> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

Cypriot communities.⁸ The individual contingents began mobilizing to support the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish contingent relocated to the northern part of the capital, where numerous clashes occurred between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.⁹ This transfer of the Turkish contingent was likely facilitated by the support of the Turkish Air Force. On December 25, the Cypriot government confronted the Turkish government over the violation of Cypriot airspace by Turkish fighter jets. In the following days, reports of Turkish naval movements along the southern coast of Turkey surfaced regularly.¹⁰ On December 26, the Cypriot government submitted a complaint¹¹ to the UN Security Council, strongly emphasizing Turkey's actions, which included:

"a) Turkish military aircraft violated Cyprus' airspace; they flew at very low altitudes, circled over Nicosia, and carried out several intimidating flyovers. These actions were intended, on the one hand, to frighten the Greek population of Cyprus and, on the other, to encourage Turkish insurgents in their persistent attacks against the police and their attempts to take control of the Greek sector.

b) Turkish warships violated Cyprus' territorial waters, with their presence and actions serving the same purpose as described above.

c) On December 25, 1963, the Turkish Prime Minister announced before the Turkish parliament the deployment of aircraft and naval units, as mentioned above, and threatened the use of force. Additionally, there were threatening movements of paratroopers along the Turkish coast closest to Cyprus.

*d) Turkish military units moved into Nicosia and joined the Turkish Cypriot insurgents fighting against the police while also attempting to attack the Greek sector."*¹²

In response to the Cypriot government's appeal, the UN Security Council included the Cyprus issue on the agenda of Meeting 1085, held on December 27, 1963. However, no significant resolution was adopted, and the Cyprus agenda remained open.¹³

⁸ See more Treaty of Alliance (with Additional Protocols). Signed at Nicosia, on 16 August 1960. Available at:

<https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/05/cy20gr20tr600816treaty20of20alliance2028with20additionnal20protocols29.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁹ UN, UNFICYP. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Available at: <https://unficyp.unmissions.org/history> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ UN, Rossides, Z.: *Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council*. Available at:

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S5488.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

¹² Ibid.

¹³ UN, Complaint by the Government of Cyprus and Decision of 27 December 1963 (1085th meeting), pp. 219-220. Available

at: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/default/files/en/sc/repertoire/59-63/Chapter%208/59-63_08-26-Complaint%20by%20the%20Government%20of%20Cyprus.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

And UN, Yearbook of UN 1963. Part Sec 1 Chapter 4: *The Question of Cyprus*, pp. 50-53.

On December 26, 1963, representatives of the governments of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey decided to intervene in the bloodshed on the island.¹⁴ Together, they formed a peacekeeping force called the Joint Truce Force,¹⁵ under British command¹⁶, which indicated Britain's continued foreign policy interest in maintaining influence over the island. This also represented an attempt (at this moment) to establish a peacekeeping force outside the organizational structures of the UN¹⁷ or NATO¹⁸. The force was led by British Major General Peter Young.¹⁹ A ceasefire was agreed upon on December 29, and on December 30, the establishment of a neutral zone along the ceasefire line ("Green Line") between the two warring communities in Nicosia was approved. This, among other things, contributed to the gradual formation of ethnic enclaves on the island.²⁰ The neutral zone was to be monitored by the joint peacekeeping forces, but in practice, this task was carried out almost exclusively by the British contingent. The "Green Line" was originally an imaginary boundary drawn by Peter Young to separate the opposing parts of Nicosia.

On January 1, 1964, British diplomacy was shaken not only by reports of continued gunfire but, more importantly, by the Cypriot government's—at that time represented mainly by Greek Cypriots—and President Makarios' attempt to annul the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Guarantee²¹. Under pressure from British diplomats, President Makarios reconsidered his position and stated that his government was merely "*seeking to ensure the termination of these treaties*

Available at:

https://cdn.un.org/unyearbook/yun/chapter_pdf/1963YUN/1963_P1_SEC1_CH4.pdf

[cit. 19. 12. 2024].

¹⁴ These three states claimed that they were acting in accordance with the Treaty of Alliance, Treaty of Establishment, and Treaty of Guarantee.

¹⁵ The Joint Truce Force was established based on two documents: the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment.

¹⁶ UK Parliament. Letter to the President of the Security Council from Mr. R. Jackling, Acting United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 8th January 1964. Cyprus Volume 687: debated on Tuesday 14 January 1964. UK Parliament, House of Commons. Available at: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1964-01-14/debates/8330e428-cb25-471f-af1e-c783788516c6/Cyprus> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

¹⁷ If the Cyprus issue were submitted to the UN, it could lead to a weakening of British influence on the island.

¹⁸ Cyprus was not a member of NATO, therefore intervention by this organization would not be possible.

¹⁹ UK Parliament. Letter to the President of the Security Council from Mr. R. Jackling, Acting United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 8th January 1964. Cyprus Volume 687: debated on Tuesday 14 January 1964. UK Parliament, House of Commons. Available at: <https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1964-01-14/debates/8330e428-cb25-471f-af1e-c783788516c6/Cyprus> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

²⁰ Broome, J. J. (2005). *Building the bridges across the Green Line: A Guide to Intercultural Communication in Cyprus*. Nicosia, p. 5.

²¹ Makarios action worries Britain; But Officials Still See Hope for Accord on Cyprus. The New York Times, January 2, 1964, p. 13. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/02/archives/makarios-action-worries-britain-but-officials-still-see-hope-for.html> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

by appropriate means.”²² President Makarios likely intended to persuade the UN Security Council to challenge the guarantee treaties by seeking the adoption of a resolution confirming the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus.²³ Such a move was, of course, unacceptable to the signatory states of the guarantee treaties, as well as to the United States, which was determined to prevent the spread of Soviet influence—or, more broadly, the influence of the Non-Aligned Movement—in the Eastern Mediterranean. Makarios' actions also sparked reactions in the press, including articles in *The New York Times*²⁴, which, for example, quoted Cypriot Vice President Fazıl Küçük, who publicly declared that he was no longer the vice president of Cyprus and that the constitution no longer existed.²⁵ F. Küçük emphasized the principles on which the Republic of Cyprus had been founded and how these foundations—based on three international treaties and the constitution—were being undermined by Makarios' actions. Vice President Küçük saw the only solution to the crisis as the partition of the island into Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones.²⁶ However, from the perspective of the international interests of key political players in the Eastern Mediterranean, neither alternative was ideal. Whether *enosis* (union with Greece) or *taksim* (partition) would likely not have reduced British and American influence on the island. At the same time, both potential arrangements for Cyprus would likely have provoked opposition from the USSR and Egypt, as both states had long sought to limit Western influence in the eastern Levant.²⁷

As previously mentioned, at the turn of 1963 and 1964, the conflict drew the attention of Turkey and the United Kingdom, and alongside the establishment of the Joint Truce Force, it was agreed that a conference of representatives of the

²² *Makarios action worries Britain; But Officials Still See Hope for Accord on Cyprus*. *The New York Times*, January 2, 1964, p. 13. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/02/archives/makarios-action-worries-britain-but-officials-still-see-hope-for.html> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

²³ Department of State, Central Files POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USUN. Passed to the White House, JCS, OSD, CIA, CINCEUR, and CINCSRIKE. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. 11. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State. Nicosia, February 13, 1964, 1:45 a.m. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d11> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

²⁴ *Cyprus: solution long way off: Recent Clashes Reflect Tenuous Greek-Turkish Relations*. *The New York Times*, January 5, 1964, Section E, p. 5. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/05/archives/cyprus-solution-long-way-off-recent-clashes-reflect-tenuous.html> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

²⁵ UN, Rossides, Z.: *Letter dated 2 May 1966 from the permanent representative of Cyprus addressed to the Secretary-General*. S7276, 2 May 1966, p. 1. A The World. *The New York Times*, January 5, 1964, section E, p. 5. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/05/archives/the-world.html> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

²⁶ CIA, The President's Intelligence Checklist, 31 December 1963, p. 2. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005996748.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

²⁷ CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate. The Cyprus Dispute, number 29.3-64. 19 June 1964, p. 1. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000273005.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

guarantor states—the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey—along with representatives of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, would be held in London in January 1964. The UN Security Council was informed of these arrangements through a letter²⁸ from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the UN, dated January 8, 1964. Unfortunately, the London Conference, which began on January 15, 1964, did not result in any concrete agreement.

Major disagreements arose regarding the political arrangement of the island and the presence of NATO forces in Cyprus. *“The Cypriot government insisted on the creation of a unified, independent state with protections for the Turkish community in Cyprus, while the leaders of the Turkish Cypriots demanded the geographical separation of the two communities. In response to the British proposal that its military forces should be replaced by military contingents from NATO members and other countries, the Cypriot government insisted that any peacekeeping forces should be under the direct control of the UN and that the entire matter should be submitted to the UN Security Council.”*²⁹

The outcome of the London Conference was likely a major disappointment not only for the United Kingdom but also for the United States, as their primary goal had been to maintain a dominant position on the island. This was evident from their negative reaction to the demand for UN involvement in resolving the Cyprus crisis, as well as from their unsuccessful attempt to settle the “Cyprus problem” on “home ground” - that is, within a narrow circle of the three treaty signatories and the two Cypriot communities that had originally established the Republic of Cyprus.

Although at the turn of 1963–1964, the British government held a key position in the newly established Joint Truce Force, it soon became clear that this alone would not be sufficient to achieve peace on the island. At the London Conference, the United Kingdom attempted to push through a proposal to create a new NATO-based peacekeeping force, despite strong opposition from Greek Cypriots. In this matter, the key partner of the United Kingdom was the United States. The United States feared that the UN might establish a peacekeeping force that would fall outside American control and could include the USSR and Yugoslavia³⁰, as well

²⁸ UN, Jackling, R. W.: Letter dated 8 January 1964 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council. Available at:

<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/607384?v=pdf#files> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

²⁹ UN, Yearbook of UN 1964. Part 1 Sec 1 Chapter 9: The Situation in Cyprus, p. 151. Available at:

https://cdn.un.org/unyearbook/yun/chapter_pdf/1964YUN/1964_P1_SEC1_CH9.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

³⁰ Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Cyprus 3. Memorandum of Conference with President Johnson. Washington, January 25, 1964, 6:30 p.m. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d3> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

as Non-Aligned Movement member states³¹. Such a development could significantly threaten U.S. interests in the region and, more importantly, jeopardize their position on the international stage in the event of a UN vote on Makarios' proposal challenging the three international treaties and the Cypriot constitution. At the same time, such a step would contradict the U.S. stance in 1963, when it had declared that only the guarantor states and the two Cypriot communities should decide on the dispute. Additionally, the U.S. had to consider that both Greece and Turkey were its allies³². The United Kingdom was initially also opposed to UN involvement, as it was concerned about its sovereign position on the island. However, in the end, Britain accepted the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force as a last resort since maintaining peace on the conflict-ridden island was becoming increasingly difficult³³. The British government eventually concluded that ensuring stability was beyond its capacity and thus had no choice but to seek allies.

After the failure of the London negotiations in mid-January 1964, the United States openly entered the discussion³⁴, which, in the context of the ongoing Cold War, could have led to Soviet intervention, as the USSR at this point supported the Greek Cypriots.³⁵ The Anglo-American plan for the settlement of Cyprus originated from a British initiative and was based on avoiding war between Turkey and Greece while keeping the Cyprus issue under NATO control. At the end of January 1964, a meeting took place in Washington, where, among other things, the British request for the deployment of American troops as part of an allied force in Cyprus was discussed.³⁶ According to George Ball, this British request was unacceptable to the U.S. for several reasons: "*An appeal to the UN was ruled out as the worst possible option. The UN could establish peacekeeping*

³¹ Makarios was one of the 25 leaders who attended the 1961 Belgrade Conference, making him one of the founding members.

³² CIA, Rustow, D. A.: *The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest*. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 2. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

³³ Ker-Lindsay, J. (1999). Britain's central role in the search for an international peacekeeping force for Cyprus, 1963-1964. *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 23 (Autumn), pp. 222-245.

³⁴ CIA, Special National Intelligence Estimate, number 29.3-64, 19 June 1964. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000273005.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

³⁵ Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ball, August 9, 1964, 6:50 a.m., Tape 64.01, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ball, August 9, 1964, 6:50 a.m., Tape 64.01, Side B, PNO 1. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d111> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

³⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Miscellaneous Meetings. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Memorandum of Conference with President Johnson. Washington, January 25, 1964, 6:30 p.m. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d3> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

*forces that would be beyond our control and in which the Russians and Yugoslavs would undoubtedly seek to participate. A NATO-based solution was also impossible, as Cyprus is not a NATO member—even though, in the worst case, two NATO allies would be fighting each other. The tripartite negotiations between the three guarantor powers—the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey—in London had failed. Prime Minister İnönü leads a weak government in Ankara and may struggle to maintain civilian control over the Turkish military. In Athens, where a provisional government is in place, a military coup is possible. The likelihood of such a coup would significantly increase if serious fighting erupted in Cyprus.”*³⁷

In response to international reactions, the United States and the United Kingdom modified their original proposal³⁸ to allow for the integration of international forces in cooperation with the UN. Under this new plan, the UN would receive reports on the activities of international peacekeeping forces but would have no authority over the peace operation.³⁹ The United States sent a mission to Cyprus, led by George Ball. The goal of the mission was to convince President Makarios to accept the Anglo-American peace proposal.⁴⁰ However, to the great displeasure of the United States and the United Kingdom, President Makarios refused to accept their plan.

The United States was unwilling to give up and continued to seek alternative ways to implement their plan. For this reason, G. Ball modified the proposal in a way that he believed would be more acceptable to President Makarios and launched a diplomatic initiative. In Greece and Turkey, G. Ball was relatively successful. In his effort to persuade President Makarios, G. Ball revised the plan twice and even met with him several times personally, but without success. The so-called “Ball Revised Plan” was based on the Anglo-American initiative to establish an expanded international peacekeeping force that would be loosely linked to the UN Security Council, yet not directly controlled by it.⁴¹ After two

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ The original plan envisioned a 10,000-strong force, composed of NATO’s main powers. The revised version included European units outside of NATO. See more: *U.S. Spurs Drive to Find Solution in Cyprus Crisis; Ball Confers with Britons and Cypriote in London, Then Flies to Athens; Chances Termed Slim; Turks Accept Plan for U.N. Link to a Peace Force but Insist on Participation*. The New York Times, February 10, 1964, p. 1. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/02/10/archives/us-spurs-drive-to-find-solution-in-cyprus-crisis-ball-confers-with.html> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

³⁹ *U.S. Spurs Drive to Find Solution in Cyprus Crisis; Ball Confers with Britons and Cypriote in London, Then Flies to Athens; Chances Termed Slim; Turks Accept Plan for U.N. Link to a Peace Force but Insist on Participation*. The New York Times, February 10, 1964, p. 1. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/02/10/archives/us-spurs-drive-to-find-solution-in-cyprus-crisis-ball-confers-with.html> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁴⁰ *Plan for Cyprus put to Makarios; Ball Meets Archbishop in Nicosia—Fighting Goes on at Limassol*. The New York Times, February 13, 1963, p. 1. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/02/13/archives/plan-for-cyprus-put-to-makarios-ball-meets-archbishop-in.html> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁴¹ Ibid.

weeks of shuttle diplomacy, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson received a grim report, stating: *"I believe the bomb in Sarajevo has already exploded, and the Archduke is dead. The governments and people of Greece and Turkey want peace, but they are like characters in a Greek tragedy. They cannot avoid catastrophe on their own without outside help."*⁴² G. Ball even compared the situation to the Cuban Missile Crisis, suggesting that this could be the second most severe crisis since that event.⁴³

On February 15, 1964, the United Kingdom and Cyprus submitted this matter to the UN Security Council, requesting a formal meeting of the council.⁴⁴ At the same time, Cypriot President Makarios also declared that the UN was the only organization whose intervention he would be willing to accept. This British-Cypriot request deeply disturbed U.S. diplomatic interests, for two key reasons. First, UN intervention in the island's affairs, and second, the potential threat to the international status of the U.S., particularly in relation to Turkey, which could rightfully feel betrayed.⁴⁵

*"Now we are getting the worst of both worlds—UN intervention, and on top of that, everyone will be angry at us. True, we managed to wriggle out of offering troops, but even so, we are now committed to playing a leading role—if only to save face before the poor Turks, who will rightfully claim that we have deceived them. Meanwhile, of course, the Greeks will continue killing Turks in Cyprus."*⁴⁶

Diplomatic negotiations at the UN Security Council level took place from mid-February 1964 until early March 1964, when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 186⁴⁷. This resolution called on member states to refrain from any

⁴² Brands, H. W. (1987). America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964. *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3, p. 354.

⁴³ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations. 462. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d462> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁴⁴ UN, Letter dated 15 February 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5543, February 15, 1964. Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/607839?v=pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁴⁵ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations 461. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d461> [cit. 19. 12. 2024]. Compare this with the growing anti-American sentiment in Turkey and, for example, the joint Soviet-Turkish project for the construction of a dam on the Arpaçay River.

⁴⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus. Secret. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations 461. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v33/d461> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁴⁷ UN, United Nations Security Council resolution, number 186 (1964). Resolution of 4 March 1964 [S/5575], pp. 2–4.

actions that could worsen the situation in Cyprus. Additionally, the resolution authorized the creation of peacekeeping forces, and the appointment of a mediator tasked with seeking a peaceful resolution to the Cyprus issue.

The UN Security Council assigned a 6,000-strong UNFICYP force⁴⁸ for a period of three months⁴⁹, with the mission to help restore normal conditions following the violence and bloodshed between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus. On March 13, the UN Security Council issued another resolution, No. 187⁵⁰, which largely reaffirmed the provisions of the March 4 resolution. Given the increasing tensions in Cyprus, the resolution declared that advance units were already on their way. UNFICYP forces were deployed on the island by the end of March 1964. It is worth noting that since Cyprus gained independence in 1960, British, Greek, and Turkish military units had been operating on the island. Their presence was legitimized through the following treaties:

1. The Treaty of Establishment allowed the United Kingdom to maintain two military bases under British sovereignty.⁵¹
2. The Treaty of Alliance permitted Greece and Turkey to station military contingents in Cyprus, consisting of 950 Greek troops and 650 Turkish troops.⁵²

At the beginning of February, the security situation on the island deteriorated once again, and clashes between the two communities intensified. A critical milestone occurred on February 13, when an attack on Turkish Cypriot targets

Available at: <https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/211/44/pdf/nr021144.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁴⁸ CIA, Rustow, D. A.: *The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest*. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 7. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁴⁹ The legalization of their presence in Cyprus was continuously extended. Eg. UN, United Nations Security Council resolution, number 192 (1964). Resolution of 20 June 1964 [S/5778], p. 1.

Available at: <https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/211/44/pdf/nr021144.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

The current mandate will expire on January 31, 2025.

⁵⁰ UN, United Nations Security Council resolution, number 187 (1964). Resolution of 13 March 1964 [S/5603], p. 1.

Available at: <https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/211/45/pdf/nr021145.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁵¹ See more: Treaty of Establishment, signed in London, on 17 February 1959. Available at: <https://www.mfa.gov.tr/treaty-concerning-the-establishment-of-the-republic-of-cyprus.en.mfa> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁵² See more: Treaty of Alliance (with Additional Protocols). Signed at Nicosia, on 16 August 1960. Available at:

https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CY%20GR%20TR_600816_Treaty%20of%20Alliance%20with%20additional%20protocols%29.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

near the city of Limassol resulted in 16 Turkish Cypriots killed and 50 wounded.⁵³ Following this aggression⁵⁴, rumours began to spread that similar bloodshed could occur in another village south of Nicosia⁵⁵. At this moment, for the first time since the outbreak of the unrest, representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in Cyprus called for military intervention from Turkey, seeing it as the only solution.⁵⁶ The Republic of Turkey found itself in a difficult position—on the one hand, it did not want to escalate the already tense situation, but on the other hand, the violence on the island was intensifying. Its consideration of direct military intervention further sparked diplomatic discussions on the Cyprus issue.⁵⁷ At the same time, Greece was also considering intervention.⁵⁸

Despite numerous negotiations, the unrest⁵⁹ between the two Cypriot communities continued.⁶⁰ The bloody clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots did not cease even after the establishment of the UN peacekeeping force, UNFICYP.⁶¹ Both Greece and Turkey became involved in the conflict to provide support to their respective communities. Turkey threatened military invasion,⁶² which was closely monitored by the United States, and by March, the United States believed that Turkey had taken steps that could lead to

⁵³ CIA, The President's Intelligence Checklist, 14 February 1964, p. 3. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005996834.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁵⁴ The Greek Cypriots believed that the Turkish Cypriots intended to seize the port. See more: CIA, The President's Intelligence Checklist, 14 February 1964, p. 3. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005996834.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁵⁵ CIA, The President's Intelligence Checklist, 15 February 1964, p. 5. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005996837.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ CIA, A, Rustow, D. A.: The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 8. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ In January 1964, armed clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots began. The U.S. government mobilized naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean (January 1964–September 1964). On January 24, 1964, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots clashed near Paphos, resulting in the deaths of two Greek Cypriots. At the beginning of February, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots fought near Agios Sozomenos, leading to the deaths of six Greek Cypriots and five Turkish Cypriots. About a week later, another confrontation occurred near Limassol, where ten Turkish Cypriots were killed. On March 9, 1964, the UN Secretary-General called for a ceasefire. On March 12, 1964, the Turkish government threatened to use military force in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots. On March 19, 1964, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots clashed near Lefka, resulting in the deaths of two Turkish Cypriots and one Greek Cypriot. On June 5, 1964, the Turkish government announced that it had abandoned plans for military intervention in Cyprus.

⁶⁰ See more: Daily Telegraph, 14 January 1964. The Observer, 16 January 1964. Washington Post, 17 January 1964. Daily Telegraph, 15 February 1964.

⁶¹ See more: UN, Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus. S/5950, p. 15. Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20S%205950.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁶² Different interpretations of Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee.

an invasion.⁶³ The situation escalated at the beginning of June 1964 when movements of a small fleet were observed in the area of the İskenderun Gulf.⁶⁴ Then-U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson firmly (and secretly) warned the Turkish side that any direct military intervention by Turkey “to protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots” could result in a Greek-Turkish war and an immediate Soviet intervention⁶⁵, against which NATO members could not guarantee adequate protection. The Republic of Turkey ultimately decided, based on Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee, not to carry out a military invasion of Cyprus, which the Turkish government officially announced on June 5, 1964.⁶⁶ However, diplomatic pressure from the United States led to a further deterioration in U.S.-Turkish relations and, conversely, to closer ties between Turkey and the USSR.⁶⁷ And at the end of the summer, Nikita S. Khrushchev expressed support for the Greek Cypriot government, likely in response to a request from Cypriot President

⁶³ CIA, Rustow, D. A.: The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 8. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ CIA, Rustow, D. A.: *The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest*. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 8. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024]. And Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister İnönü, telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey. 5 June 1964. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d54> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁶⁶ Johnson Library, National Security File, Head of State Correspondence, Turkey, Prime Minister İnönü, telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey. 5 June 1964. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d54> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁶⁷ Giritli, I. (1970). Turkish-Soviet Relations. *India Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 16. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/45069412.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A09d2509794a5b05672f277ade9eac22a&ab_segments=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 [cit. 19. 12. 2024]. And CIA, Economic and Intelligence Committee of the United States Intelligence Board: Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in less developed areas of the Free World, 1 January – 30 June 1964, p. 8. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP92B01090R000400010018-4.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024]. And CIA, Aid and Trade Activities of Communist Countries in less developed areas of the Free World 1965. March 1966, pp 8, 11. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP92B01090R000400010024-7.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

Makarios, who had sought support from the USSR⁶⁸ and Egypt^{69, 70}. On September 30, an agreement was signed between the USSR and the Greek Cypriot government for the supply of surface-to-air missiles.⁷¹ With these steps, the USSR gradually consolidated its position.

After the firm warning from the U.S. president, G. Ball once again travelled to Greece and Turkey. Shortly thereafter, Mustafa İsmet İnönü and Georgios Papandreou separately visited the U.S. president in Washington⁷² at the end of June, where they were offered a joint meeting at Camp David.⁷³ The Greek prime minister rejected the proposal, while the Turkish representative agreed.⁷⁴ However, both accepted the offer to begin negotiations in Geneva, led by Dean Acheson.⁷⁵ Meanwhile, on June 12⁷⁶, General George Grivas arrived in Cyprus along with a significant number of soldiers from mainland Greece⁷⁷. Grivas was a strong proponent of enosis⁷⁸, and upon his arrival, he took command of the

⁶⁸ CIA, The White House outgoing message. The President's Intelligence Checklist, 9 August 1964, p. 2. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005959349.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024]. And CIA, Intelligence Brief. Status of Soviet Arms Aid to Cyprus. CIA/RR CB 65-59, October 1965, pp. 3-10. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01003A002400090001-5.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁶⁹ CIA, The President's Intelligence Checklist, 31 August 1964, p. 3. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005959392.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024]. And CIA, Intelligence Brief. Status of Soviet Arms Aid to Cyprus. CIA/RR CB 65-59, October 1965, pp. 3-10. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01003A002400090001-5.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁷⁰ Since the end of 1963, the USSR had declared its support for the leader of the Greek Cypriots and expressed its commitment to the island's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. The USSR's goal was to minimize NATO's influence on one hand and maximize the role of the UN on the other, as the UN provided the USSR with a platform to intervene in Cyprus affairs—something that President Makarios was undoubtedly aware of. (See more: Bölükbaşı, S (1998). The Cyprus Dispute and the U.N.: Peaceful Non-Settlement Between 1954-1998. *The International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 39, p. 417.

⁷¹ CIA, Rustow, D. A.: The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 9. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024]

⁷² M. İ. İnönü also held talks in Paris, where he discussed the matter with representatives of the United Kingdom.

⁷³ CIA, Rustow, D. A.: The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 10. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 9.

⁷⁵ CIA, Summary of Comments on Cyprus situation, p. 1. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050004-4.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 3.

⁷⁷ CIA, Summary of Comments on Cyprus situation, p. 3. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050004-4.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 9.

National Guard, strengthening the Greek Cypriot position.⁷⁹ General Grivas gathered around him militant groups that were not under the control of President Makarios,⁸⁰ adding a new dimension to the unfolding events, the consequences of which soon became evident.

At the beginning of July, the Cyprus issue moved to Geneva, where Greek and Turkish diplomats met alternately with the American delegation, led by Dean Acheson. Although high hopes were initially placed on the Geneva talks, after approximately two months, it became clear that the negotiations led by Acheson were unsuccessful.⁸¹ Both the Greek and Cypriot governments declared that none of the proposed solutions were acceptable to them. Once again, it was President Makarios who spoke on behalf of the Greek and Cypriot sides, stating: “...Mr. Acheson's proposal, based on the principle of compensating Turkish rights, is absolutely unacceptable.”⁸² According to American diplomacy, the core disagreements revolved around two main points: “The weakness of the Greek government, which was unwilling to enter Cyprus and take control, and the insistence of the Turks on having a sovereign base on the island, which essentially meant partition. The Greeks insisted that they would lease a certain area to the Turks; hence, enosis emerged.”⁸³

Despite all diplomatic efforts, tensions of varying intensity shook the island throughout the summer of 1964. The already difficult situation dramatically worsened between August 5 - 9, 1964.⁸⁴ Greek forces occupied a Turkish enclave

⁷⁹ CIA, Rustow, D. A.: The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 9. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁸⁰ CIA, Summary of Comments on Cyprus situation, p. 9. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050004-4.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁸¹ Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Smith. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Summary Notes of the 542d Meeting of the National Security Council. Washington, September 1, 1964, 12:45–1:15 p.m. Global Briefing-Cyprus. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d150> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁸² CIA, Rustow, D. A.: The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 10. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁸³ Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret/Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Smith. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Summary Notes of the 542d Meeting of the National Security Council. Washington, September 1, 1964, 12:45–1:15 p.m. Global Briefing-Cyprus. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d150> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁸⁴ UN, Letter dated 10 August 1964 from the Prime Minister of Turkey addressed to the President of the Security Council. Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/609560?v=pdf#files> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

in the northwest of the island, prompting a response from Turkish air forces from the mainland.⁸⁵ Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots once again launched offensive actions, with the first clashes occurring on August 6, 1964, in the areas of Kokkina and Mansoura. Cypriot President Makarios referred the matter to the UN Security Council on August 8, and the following day, the UN issued Resolution No. 193⁸⁶, calling for an immediate ceasefire and the restoration of peace and security. Fighting continued around Kokkina and Mansoura, where Turkish air forces⁸⁷ attacked Greek Cypriot targets. U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson called for negotiations on a ceasefire.⁸⁸ The matter was brought before the UN, and on August 8 and 9, the UN Security Council convened, adopting Resolution No. 193⁸⁹, which, among other things, called for an immediate ceasefire. Both the governments of Cyprus and Turkey accepted the ceasefire unconditionally. The highly tense situation ultimately led to a truce⁹⁰, but it

⁸⁵ CIA, Rustow, D. A.: The Cyprus Conflict and United States Security Interest. Memorandum RM-5416-ISA, September 1967, p. 10. Available at: <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000500110010-6.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁸⁶ UN, United Nations Security Council resolution, number 193 (1964). Resolution of 9 August 1964 [S/5868]. Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20SRES%20193.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].
Note: The resolution was adopted in the absence of the USSR and Czechoslovakia.

⁸⁷ On the morning of August 9, 1964, Turkish military forces allegedly used napalm during the bombing of Greek Cypriot targets, which was in violation of the UN Charter. See more: Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ball, August 9, 1964, 6:50 a.m., Tape 64.01, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ball, August 9, 1964, 6:50 a.m., Tape 64.01, Side B, PNO 1. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d111> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁸⁸ Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ball, August 9, 1964, 6:50 a.m., Tape 64.01, Side B, PNO 1. No classification marking. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Recording of a Telephone Conversation Between President Johnson and Ball, August 9, 1964, 6:50 a.m., Tape 64.01, Side B, PNO 1. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d111> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁸⁹ UN, United Nations Security Council resolution, number 193 (1964). Resolution of 9 August 1964 [S/5868], p. 6. Available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/112188?v=pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

⁹⁰ UN, Chapter VIII. Maintenance of international peace and security, pp. 108-127. Available at: https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/sites/default/files/en/sc/repertoire/64-65/Chapter%208/64-65_08-4-Complaint%20by%20the%20Government%20of%20Cyprus.pdf [cit. 19. 12. 2024].
UN, United Nations Security Council resolution, number 193 (1964). Resolution of 9 August 1964 [S/5868]. Available at: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Cyprus%20SRES%20193.pdf> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

remained fragile and uncertain⁹¹, quickly resurfacing as an issue on the international stage.

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https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005996748.pdf
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⁹¹ Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 6. Top Secret. Drafted by Bundy on August 13. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey. Memorandum for the Record, August 10, 1964, 12:35 PM. Available at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v16/d119> [cit. 19. 12. 2024].

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