

The League of Zelená Hora and the Jagiellonian Candidacy for the Bohemian Throne

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The study deals with the development and transformation of the attitudes of the power block of the Bohemian Catholic nobility of the so-called League of Zelená Hora towards the Jagiellonian candidacy for the Bohemian throne. It first offered the throne to the Jagiellonians itself and anticipated in return the military support of Poland in the war with the present King of Bohemia George of Poděbrady. Polish mediation in fact did save the League of Zelená Hora from defeat, but the League did not want to accept the Jagiellonian tactic of neutrality. Thanks to the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus, it received military assistance, which led it to deny Polish claims by electing Corvinus as King of Bohemia in 1469. When King George began negotiations on Polish succession with the Krakow court, the League, on the other hand, tried to prevent Polish success by political means. After the election of Władysław II Jagiełło as Bohemian king, it did not recognise him, but was interested in a military confrontation and only after the pressure of Matthias Corvinus did it join the so-called War of the Three Kings with Władysław and his father Casimir IV. Nevertheless, it still preferred a diplomatic resolution of the dispute and peaceful coexistence with Władysław's party in Bohemia.

Keywords: Late Middle Ages; Central Europe; League of Zelená Hora; Polish king; Jagiellonians

The Polish dynasty of the Jagiellonians acceded to the Bohemian throne through the free election of Władysław II Jagiełło by the land diet on May 27, 1471. This happened mainly through the votes of the power supports of the previous king George of Poděbrady, who already in June 1469 had presented the proposal for Polish succession to the Bohemian estates.¹

¹ Heymann, G. F. (1965). *George of Bohemia: King of Heretics*. Princeton University Press, pp. 568–569; Macek, J. (1967). *Jiří z Poděbrad* [George of Poděbrady]. Praha, pp. 340–341 and Čornej, P. – Bartlová, M. (2007). *Velké dějiny země Koruny české VI. (1437–1526)* [Great History of the Lands of the Bohemian Crown (1437–1526)], Praha-Litomyšl, Paseka, p. 263. In more detail including the source base, see Footnote 53.

However, even earlier the opposition bloc of members of the high aristocracy active in 1465–1479, for whom the name the League of Zelená Hora was used in the historiography based on the name of its constitutive congress, had offered the Bohemian royal crown to the Polish ruler. The price for accession to the Bohemian throne was to be decisive military support in the war against precisely George of Poděbrady.

The League of Zelená Hora was comprised of the bishop of Wrocław Jošt of Rožmberk, Jan of Rožmberk (ruler of the Rosenberg family in 1457–1472), the supreme burgrave of Prague Zdeněk of Šternberk, the supreme court judge of the Kingdom of Bohemia Jan Zajíc of Házmburk, his brother Oldřich Zajíc of Házmburk, Bohuslav VII of Švamberk, Vilém of Ilburk, Jindřich the Elder of Plavno, Děpolt of Rýzmburk, Zdeněk's sons Jaroslav and Jan of Šternberk, Jindřich of Hradec, Burian of Gutštejn, Jindřich the Younger of Plavno, Linhart of Gutštejn and at Klenová and Dobrohost of Ronšperk. In addition to its political goals, the opposition bloc was also intertwined with an intricate network of kinship ties. It gradually added other nobles and even two important Bohemian royal cities – Pilsen and České Budějovice. Wrocław was considered an “associate member” with an autonomous position and later also the Olomouc bishop Protasius (Tas) of Boskovice and large Moravian towns joined this organisation.²

² On the circumstances of the creation of the League of Zelená Hora and the first years of its activity, see Markgraf, H. (1877). Die Bildung der katolischen Liga gegen Georg von Podiebrad. *Historische Zeitschrift* 38, pp. 42–82, 251–277 and Válka, J. (1984). Stavovství a krize českého státu ve druhé polovině 15. století [Estatism and the crisis of the Bohemian state in the first half of the 15th century], *Folia Historica Bohemica* 6, pp. 65–89. On the familial ties within the association, see Nohová, I. (2008) *Příbuzenské vztahy členů Zelenohorské jednoty* [The familial relations of the members of the League of Zelená Hora]. Praha; Šandera, M. (2016). Zelenohorská jednota. Stav poznání, otázky a úkoly [The League of Zelená Hora: State of the art, questions and tasks]. In: M. Šandera – Z. Beran a kol., *Poděbradská éra v zemích České koruny*. Praha, Lidové noviny, pp. 172–182 and pp. 270–276. The power of the League of Zelená Hora mainly lay in the castles and other strong points (Český Krumlov, Velešín, Helfenburk, Vimperk, Nové Hrady, Choustník, Lutová, Zvírotice, Vítkův Kámen, Zvíkov, Milčín, Rožmberk, Dívčí Kámen, Třeboň, Konopiště, Elfenburk, Český Šternberk, Lešno, Kostelec nad Sázavou, Roudnice nad Labem, Zelená Hora, Vitoraz, Kost, Chvatěruby, Hrubá Skála, Trosky, Budyně nad Ohří, Vřeštov, Navarov, Chvatěruby, Oltářík, Andělská Hora, Žerotín, Rabštejn, Frymburk, Kynžvart, Bečov, Bochov, Nový Hartenštejn, Jindřichův Hradec, Gutštejn, Nečtiny, Klenová, Horšovský Týn, Starý Herštejn, Ronšperk, Krašov, Libštejn, Zbiroh, Bechyně among others), where the Rožmberks, Šternberks and Házmburks had ca 60 % of the total number of castle fortifications. The second captain of the League of Zelená Hora Zdeněk of Šternberk was titled in the papers as “*najvyšší hauptmann prelátuoov, kniežat, pánuov i obcí křesťanských v poslušenstvie Otce Svätého stojících slavné koruny České všech křesťanuov, kteříž jsou v poslušenstvie*”

The breadth of the promotional campaign and the effort to make its dispute with the king an international theme surpassed all of its predecessors (aristocratic groups appearing under the slogan “bonum commune” against the king), because they expected a strong foreign ally in an open conflict with King George.³

When in 1467 in Krakow the emissary of the captain of the League Zdeněk of Šternberk presented his plan of the Polish succession and argued with the willingness to recognise his claims to the Bohemian throne as the husband of the sister of the previous Bohemian king Ladislaus the Posthumous Elisabeth of Habsburg, it was already the third time in the course of the 15th century that the House of Jagiellonian had been offered the Crown of St Wenceslas. The representatives of the Hussites did so the first time in 1420–1421 to Casimir’s father, Wladyslaw. Paradoxically, Casimir himself had already been elected Bohemian king once; it took place again on the part of the Utraquists in May 1438 in Mělník, but the military campaign was then (not for the last time) conducted so lazily by the Polish side that the Polish prince did not assert himself against the son-in-law of the late Luxembourg, Sigismund Albrecht of Habsburg.⁴

The future leaders of the League of Zelená Hora had the opportunity to meet in person with Casimir IV at the time of the Głogów congress in May 1462, Zdeněk of Šternberk even two years earlier at the congress in Bytom. In Głogów, Šternberk even had the honorary mission to go out to meet and welcome Casimir IV on behalf of the Bohemian king. The Głogów congress made a large impression on the future representatives of the League and evoked a distorted imagination of the great military power of King Casimir.⁵

kostela římského v království českém a markrabství moravském” [the highest hauptmann of prelates, princes, lords and Christian communities in obedience to the Holy Father standing the famous Bohemian crown of all Christians who are in obedience to the Roman Church in the Bohemian Kingdom and the Moravian Margraviate] – SOKA Jihlava, fond: Archív města Jihlava, sign. 176.

³ On the correspondence with the emperor and the imperial feudality, see *Urkundliche Nachträge zur österreichische-deutsche Geschichte im Zeilater Kaiser Friedrich III.* (1892). A. Bachmann (Ed.), Wien. On the beginnings of the negotiations with the Hungarian king, see Kalous, A. (2007.) *Matyáš Korvín. Uherský a český král* [Matthias Corvinus: Hungarian and Bohemian king]. České Budějovice, Vedita, pp. 125–126. An overall assessment was presented by Šandera, M. (2016). *Zelenohorská jednota. Stav poznání, otázky a úkoly*, In: M. Šandera – Z. Beran, a kol., *Poděbradská éra v zemích České koruny*. Praha, Lidové noviny, pp. 172–182.

⁴ For a brief summary, see Čornej, P. – Bartlová, M. (2007), *Velké dějiny země Koruny české VI*. Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka, p. 409. Heck, R. (1964), *Tabor i kandidatura jagiellońska w Czechach (1438–1444)* [Tabor and the Jagiellonian candidacy in Bohemia (1438–1444)]. Wrocław, pp. 67–68. Šandera, M. (2011). *Hynce Ptáček z Pirkštejna*. Praha, Nakladatelství Vyšehrad, pp. 53–55.

The open conflict of the league of Bohemian Catholic lords with King George began in the summer of 1465, but the aim at first was not to achieve his fall but to avoid the succession of one of his sons (there was a fear that George would try to impose his election still during his lifetime). The Roman Curia could have been more straightforward, at the same time it was already driving King George as a heretic before its court and in its decrees depriving his subjects of his oath of allegiance. Rome did not hide its plan to overthrow him, for the first time the idea that Jagiellonian could replace George on the Czech throne was expressed in 1463 by Pope Pius II, albeit for the time being on the level of theoretical consideration.⁶ Casimir IV himself heard it from curial diplomats in 1466, thus a year earlier than the League of Zelená Hora. Already in May 1466 Pope Paul II asked King Casimir to support the Bohemian Catholic lords and the city of Pilsen in their conflict with King George.⁷ Bishop Rudolf of Rudesheim was sent to Toruń as a mediator of the peace between Poland and the Order of the Teutonic Knights with an order to table the Bohemian question as well at the Polish court.⁸ When the League of Zelená

⁵ On the January congress in Bytom *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae – Jana Długosza Roczniki czyli korniki sławnego królewskiego polskiego. Księga dwunacta 1445–1461*, (2004) K. Baczkowski – M. Kowalczyk – K. Ożóg – C. Pirożyńska – D. Turkowska – J. Wyrozumski (red). Warszawa, Wydawnictwo naukowe PWN, p. 380 and on the November meeting, *ibid* (1860). *Fontes rerum Austriacarum XX, Urkundliche Beiträge zur Geschichte Böhmens und seiner Nachbarländer im Zeitalter Georgs von Podiebrad (1450–1471)* (1860). F. Palacký (Ed.). Wien, p. 236., *Codex diplomaticus regni Poloniae I* (1758). M. Dogiel (Ed.) Vilnae, p. 10. From the literature, see in more detail Heck, R. (1964). *Zjazd Głogowski* [Głogów Congress], Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, pp. 48–70. In contrast to the two-thousand-person retinue of King George, the Polish retinue was much more numerous, the preserved sources even number them at 5,000 horsemen. The agreement from Głogów in *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum oder Sammlung schlesischer Geschichtschreiber* Bd. VIII (1873). H. Markgraf (Ed.), Breslau: Josef Max a. Comp., pp. 97–100.

⁶ See the recorded interview of Pius II with the Wrocław emissary Hans Weinrich – *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum oder Sammlung schlesischer Geschichtschreiber. IX. Politische correspondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter Georgs von Podiebrad*, Bd.9. (1874). H. Markgraf (Ed.), Breslau, p. 7.

⁷ For the text of the pope's call, see *Ibid*, p. 168. Emperor Frederick III received the same letter.

⁸ On the Toruń peace and the mission of the bishop of Lavant Rudolf *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae – Jana Długosza Roczniki czyli korniki sławnego królewskiego polskiego. Księga dwunacta 1462–1480* (2006). K. Baczkowski – M. Kowalczyk – K. Ożóg – C. Pirożyńska – D. Turkowska – J. Wyrozumski (Eds.), Warszawa, Wydawnictwo naukowe PWN, pp. 160–161. From the literature, Drabina, J. (1974), *Działalność dyplomatyczna legata apostolskiego Rudolfa z Rudesheim na Śląsku* [The diplomatic activity of the apostolic legate Rudolf of Rudesheim in Silesia], in: *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis*

Hora in September of the same year through its plenipotentiary Dobrohost of Ronšperk presented to the representatives of the curia in Rome a plan for the succession of the Jagiellonians to the Bohemian throne, they then repeated their vision in fact.⁹

Poland as the leading contemporary European support of Catholicism does not correspond to the image of Poland in the late Middle Ages, although the loud propaganda of Zbigniew Oleśnicki's party tried to create the opposite impression, but the actual state was significantly different. Whereas in Lesser Poland, the influence of the clergy was stronger, in Greater Poland great sympathy was expressed with the Bohemian reformation, especially with the local nobility. Bohemian mercenaries on the Polish side also played their part in the thirteen-year war against the Teutonic Knights. Although it ended successfully for Poland, it had long-term consequences in military and financial exhaustion. Poland, therefore, had little support in the role of leader of the anti-Utraquist, anti-Bohemian crusade. To the credit of Casimir and his counsellors, they were well aware of this. It was mainly the Calixtine part of Bohemia and Moravia, which was led by old traditions from the years of the Hussite revolution to seeing possible allies in the Poles.¹⁰ A number

Nr. 195, *Historia* 23, pp. 205–28; *Peter Eschenloer Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd. 1 (2003). G. Roth (Ed), New York – München – Berlin Waxmann Münster, p. 567. On the diplomatic activities of Rudolf of Rüdesheim, bishop of Lavant and later Wrocław, see also Kalouse, A. (2010). *Plenitudo potestatis in patribus? Papežští legáti a nunciové ve střední Evropě na konci středověku (1450–1525)* [Plenitudo potestatis in patribus? Papal legates and nuncios in Central Europe at the end of the Middle Ages (1450–1525)], Brno, Matice moravská, pp. 201–213.

⁹ Papée, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę (1466–1471)* [Treatments on the Crown of Bohemia (1466–1471)]. *Studia i skicze z czasów Kazimiera Jagiellonczika*, Warszawa, p. 59 shifted this mission of Dobrohost to 1465, however, the view that was offered by Tobolka, Z. V. (1898). *Styky krále českého Jiřího z Poděbrad s králem polským Kazimírem* [Contacts of Bohemian King George of Poděbrady with Polish King Casimir]. Brno, pp. 11–12, seems more realistic. In 1465, the League of Zelená Hora, as it also says in its programme, see Státní oblastní archiv Třeboň, fond Historica Třeboň, sg. 1887, fol. 11r–20r, editorially *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské IV*. (1846). F. Palacký (Ed.), Praha, V Komisi u Kronberga i Rívnáče, pp. 102–105, saw as its aim in the royal question to stop the election of Poděbrady's son and only radicalised over time. On the person of Dobrohost of Rošperk, see Jánský, J. (2013). *Dobrohostové z Ronšperka a na Poděžovicích, rod erbu berana* [The Dobrohosts of Ronšperk and at Poděžovice, family of the coat-of-arms of the ram], Domažlice, Nakladatelství Českého lesa, pp. 159, 163 and 165–166.

¹⁰ For an assessment of the position of Zbigniew Oleśnicki on the Bohemian question, see Urbánek, R. (1915). *České dějiny III.1, Věk poděbradský I* [Czech History III/1: The Age of Poděbrady I], Praha, Leichter, pp. 58–59. Koczerska, M. (2004). *Zbigniew Oleśnicki i Kościół*

of Polish priests expressed fears that Poland's intensive entry into Bohemian affairs would not result in the suppression of the Bohemian heresy, but on the contrary would lead to heresies spreading frighteningly in Poland as well.

Despite this, the Bohemian Catholic League now saw precisely the Polish king as the most natural ally against George, because Emperor Frederick III, the political protector of the League in 1465–1467, was not able to play the role of Sigismund of Luxembourg and stand at the head of a crusade against the Bohemian Utraquists. Both Zdeněk of Šternberk and Jan of Rožmberk knew the emperor personally, had properties in Austria as well and Šternberk even boasted of the title of imperial councillor. The Zelená Hora members tried to rely on the emperor's authority in legitimising their approach, as the association tried to give its so-far only proclamatory rebellion against the king, thanks to an educated lawyer Jan of Házmburk, the real brain of the League, the form of a legal dispute over the king's disregarded estates' privileges and the religious emphasis was until then only in the background.¹¹ Although there was rumours circulating in Bohemia about a conspiracy to replace King George with the emperor's son Maximilian, Šternberk and the Rožmberks knew well that the emperor was anything but a warrior.¹²

krakowski w czasach jego pontyfikatu (1432–1455), Warszawa. On the traditional view of Hussite Bohemia on Poles as a possible ally, see Heck, R. (1964). Tabor i kandidatura, p. 24 and esp. Šmahel, F. (1999). Husyckie pojecie wzajemności slowiańskiej i czesko-polskie [The Hussite concept of Slavic and Bohemian-Polish reciprocity], In *Polskie echa husytyzm. Materiały z konferencji naukowej, Kłodzko 27–28 wrzesnia 1996*, eds. S. Byłona – R. Gladkiewicz, Warszawa, pp. 9–19.

¹¹ On the congress in Jindřichův Hradec, Šternberk provocatively announced that the privilegia granted by the Bohemian king to the higher aristocracy are only valid if they are confirmed by the emperor, see Martinovský, I. (2007). Domnělý kodifikační pokus krále Jiřího [The alleged codification attempt of King George], In *Vladislavské zřízení zemské a navazující prameny (Svatováclavská smlouva a Zřízení o ručnicích)*. (2007). P. Kreuz – I. Martinovský (Eds.), Praha, pp. 30–32.

¹² A copy of Šternberk's letter to the emperor with the request that he clear him and his advisor Count Rohrbach from the accusation that they prepared a conspiracy with the aim of murdering King George and putting the emperor's son Maximilian on the Bohemian throne + the attached defence by Rohrbach is in SOA Třeboň, fond Historica, inv. Nr. 1492, sg. 1898 and inv. Nr. 2432–2434. The summary of the letter addressed to the Bohemian clergy and towns, where the emperor indicated that Šternberk could not have done anything with Jan of Rohrbach, because this man was on his order sent to Neuburg several days before Šternberk's arrival – *Regesten Kaiser Friedrichs*, Heft 26, (1982). H. Koller, Heinrich – P. J. Heinig – A. Niederstätter, Alois (Eds.), Wien p. 270, Nr. 633 and 634. On Šternberk's position in the imperial council, see Heinig, P. J. (1997). *Kaiser Friedrich III. Hof, Regierung und Politik*, T.1, Köln–Weimar–Wien, p. 427.

In the eyes of the League, a Habsburg was not to replace Poděbrady on the throne but a Jagiellonian. It was the first time in Czech history that the Bohemian crown was offered to the Jagiellonians by the domestic Catholics. The prize was to be open military aid against the heretic on the Bohemian throne, or directly taking over the leadership of the crusade.¹³ They had no idea that the Polish king did not intend to pay this price. Neither did the Roman Curia know, who had counted on him for this role.

The first direct attempt on the part of the League of Zelená Hora to contact Polish diplomats and present to them the offer of the Bohemian throne for the Polish king or his son took place in January 1467 in Wrocław. The Polish envoys Jan of Ostroróg and Wincenty Kielbasa, who stopped here on their way to Rome, heard this proposal from the representatives of the League in the presence of the legate Rudolf, and therefore did not reject it out of hand, but their answer was evasive, in any case it was the first proved attempt to pull specific Polish people into their game.¹⁴

In February 1467, the League sent Dobrohost of Ronšperk to Rome, this time already with the clear request for the Holy Father to appoint a new king for the Bohemians. In their eyes, the most suitable person is the Polish Jagiellonian, who has a claim to the throne through his wife and has his hands free to fight King George. The League presented to the representatives of the curia the plan of the succession of the Jagiellonians to the Bohemian throne. The pope promised that the Curia would fully safeguard their efforts.¹⁵

King George had already lost patience with the behaviour of the League of Zelená Hora, which had been trying to gain time for two years by pretending that its revolt was only a legal dispute over the sovereign's disregard of their estates' privileges. On 20 April, King George issued letters of defiance to all its representatives. War broke out. The rapid intervention of the royal troops surprised the Catholic lords. On May 2, 1467, the League of Zelená Hora in Jindřichův Hradec, which then fulfilled the role of the military centre of the resistance to George of Poděbrady, had a letter drawn up, in which it announced that it no longer intended to obey

¹³ It was symbolically declared directly in Wrocław, just like in 1420 1st crusade against the Hussites – *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd. I (2003). G. Roth (Ed.), Münster : Waxmann, pp. 607–608.

¹⁴ Letter of the Wrocław city council to Pope Paul II from 17 January 1467, *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum*. Bd.9. (1874), p. 217, Nr. 348.

¹⁵ *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum oder Sammlung schlesischer Geschichtschreiber*. Bd.13. *Politische Correspondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter des Königs Matthias Corvinus Abt. 1 : 1469–1479*. (1874). H. Wendt – B. Kronthal, (Eds.), pp. 55. From the literature, see Tobolka, Z.V. (1898). *Styky krále českého Jiřího z Poděbrad s králem polským Kazimírem*, p.16 and Papée, F. (1907). *Zabíegi o czeską koronę*, p. 59.

the cursed heretic George and begged the Polish king to take it under his protection and defend the holy faith as well as the hereditary right of his wife Elizabeth and their sons to the Bohemian Crown.¹⁶

The first attempt of the League of Zelená Hora was truly badly timed and not even an appropriate form had been selected. King Casimir was then at the diet in Piotrkow. The envoy of the League just missed the departing emissary of King George Jan of Cimburk, who could leave Piotrkow satisfied. There is no danger to his master on the part of the Polish. In contrast, the messenger of the League (the sources have not even preserved his name) encountered an inauspicious reaction. The letter, which he submitted, impacted the king and his closest surrounding as unfortunately formulated if not confused.¹⁷ The envoy only received the response that the members of the royal council had already left the diet for their homes and without them the king would not resolve this affair. A very experienced man like Zdeněk of Šternberk, who himself had been at the head of several missions to foreign courts, could not expect that in such an important matter Casimir would make any binding statement based on a single envoy with a letter, but the beginning of the war had completely surprised the League of Zelená Hora, and instead of a representative message it truly could only send a request for help in the first days.

Another tactic of the League of Zelená Hora in relation to the Polish Question was tuned in Wrocław. The legate Rudolf of Rüdeshheim reassured Zdeněk of Šternberk and the other lords disappointed by the rebuff of their emissary in Piotrkow and acquainted them with the papal bull issued on 14 May in which Paul II empowered them to have Casimir IV elected and accepted as the Bohemian king.¹⁸

¹⁶ The text of the renewed regulation of the League was available to *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd. 2 (2003). G. Roth (Ed.), Münster: Waxmann, pp. 605–607. For the declaration of hostility to Zdeněk of Šternberk on the part of King George, see *Království dvojího lidu* (1989). P. Čornej (Ed.) Praha, pp. 161–162, Nr. 73. The Polish translation of the letter from May 2, 1467 was printed by Miemczewicz, J. U. (1822). *Zbiór pamiętników historycznych o dawnéj Polsce z rękopismów, tudzież dzieł w różnych językach o Polsce wydanych oraz z listami oryginalnemi królów i znakomitych ludzi w kraju naszym* [A collection of historical diaries about old Poland from manuscripts, as well as works in different languages about Poland and also issued with original letters of kings and eminent people in our country] T.I; Warszawa, pp. 364–365.

¹⁷ According to the brief recapitulation presented by *Joannnis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 196. The emissary in fact presented the letter from 2 May, not the document on Casimir's election in Jihlava. Papée, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 67 doubted the actual act of the election with the comment that the preserved letter is dated with another day and issued in Jindřichův Hradec- for more, see Note 18.

¹⁸ The text of the papal bull from May 14, 1467 in *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum*. B. 9. (1874), pp. 229–230, Nr. 361 and *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), pp. 646–647.

It is logical that it was only under this impression that the League of Zelená Hora proceeded to a more decisive and much more confident act. The new document, which was to be presented to the Polish monarch, was no longer just a request for protection of the Bohemian Catholic League. It announced that the league had elected Casimir Bohemian king. If he could not accept it himself, then the election applied to his eldest son, both on the condition that he provide it with military assistance and that he does so as soon as possible.¹⁹

The second attempt of the League to contact King Casimir and the Polish court with the offer of the Bohemian crown took place at the beginning of July. Surprisingly, once again none of the 6 aristocratic members of the league travelled to Krakow; they were fully occupied with the defence of their estates against Poděbrady's troops, during two months a third of their strongholds had been besieged. The Wrocław bishop Jošt undoubtedly represented a suitable person who had already been received with dignity with regard to his office, but was at that time fully engaged in the war campaign against the Silesian holdings of the Poděbrady family – Minsterberg and Frankenstein, the purpose of which was to lure royal troops away from besieged Bohemian castles. Moreover, he suffered from ever-increasing health problems. The captain of the league, Zdeněk of Šternberk, relied on papal diplomacy to carry out the main work. The parish priest of Jindřichův Hradec, Eliáš, was chosen, who already had experience from an important mission to the pope in the autumn of 1466. Eliáš first headed to Wrocław, where Councillor Lukáš Eisenreich and Canon Jan Hoffmann joined him.²⁰

¹⁹ Kiryk, F. (1967). *Jakub z Děbna*, p. 96 correctly states that it was only the July emissary that informed the Polish king of the election in Jihlava. Papée (1907), *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 67 doubted if the election in Jihlavě took place at all. He is right that Długosz evidently refers to the letter from 2 May issued in Jindřichův Hradec, but he is not the only one who informs on the act in Jihlava. Kaprinai, I. (1767), *Hungaria Diplomatica Temporibus Mathiae De Hunyad Regis Hungariae III*. Vindoboane, p. 591. Höfler, *Geschichtschreiber III*, p. 225, mentions the members of the mission and that they were to inform of Casimir's election as Bohemian king, the legate Rudolf also touches on that in a later report, *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum*. Bd.13., p. 55. From the literature Tobolka, Z. V. (1898). *Styky krále českého*, p.18. However, it is a question why the letter from 2 May has been preserved and not the much more important June document.

²⁰ Eliáš was definitely not a common parish priest from a subject town, in 1463–1474 he was the administrator of the bishopric of Litomyšl, a doctor of theology, in 1466 the League of Zelená Hora sent him to Rome to Pope Paul II. He returned with better results than Dobrohost of Ronšperk had in the spring, mainly with the promise of financial aid for the Bohemian Catholic league. From 1463, he held the post of administrator of the Litomyšl bishopric, see Večeře, V. (2019) *Litomyšlské biskupství po roce 1421* [The Litomyšl Bishopric after 1421]. In *Studia Mediaevalia Bohemia* 10/2018, Nr. 1, pp. 27–28. *Peter Eschenloer*.

On July 8, they arrived in Krakow, and papal diplomacy in the form of Dean of Aachen, Petrus de Ercelens, and Franciscan Gabriel Rongoni of Verona, secured a more dignified reception for the envoy of the League than did its May predecessor. Moreover, parish priest Eliáš had with him a document sealed by all of the founding members of the League with a clear offer of the throne. The Polish monarch was called upon to accept the election as the Bohemian king for himself or on behalf of his sons.²¹

Casimir found himself in the same situation as his father Wladyslaw had been in 1421. He was also offered the Bohemian crown by people who had recently accepted another man as king. Wladyslaw then refused, because such an act, despite the political context, was not Christian and chivalrous in his eyes and he could provide the Polish nobility with an argument for a similar step in the future. He then told the Bohemian envoys that he would not create such a dangerous precedence.²² How did his son behave in the same position, but thanks to the attitude of the pope a slightly easier situation?

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- Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.1 (2003), p. 530. In a later report from August 1471, which is a recapitulation in the affair of the dispute of the Jagellonians and Mathias Corvinus for the Bohemian throne, both mention as a member of the mission the legate Rudolf – *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum* Bd. 13. *Politische Correspondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter des Königs Matthias Corvinus*. Abt. 1: 1469–1479 (1893). B. Kronthal – H. Wendt, Breslau, p. 55, Nr. 82. *Joannis Długossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 199 mentions the place but they did not come with parish priest Eliáš. Gabriele Rongoni of Verona accompanied by the names Lukáš Eisenreich and Dr. Jan Hoffmann of Wrocław, were in Krakow but with another mission. Palacký, F. (1921). *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě*. [The History of the Bohemian Nation in Bohemia and Moravia]. Praha, Nakladatel B. Kočí, p. 948. On the military campaign of the Silesians then against Münsterberg and Frankenštejn, see Peter Eschenloer. *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), pp. 614–619.
- ²¹ *Joannis Długossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 199. Papée, F. (1907) *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 67, believed that Długosz mistakenly listed the text of the letter from 2 May as proof of the election and drew the conclusion that the election in Jihlava never happened. However, Długosz does not name the specific date or place of the election. Precedence with an election outside the framework of a diet would already exist and paradoxically connected directly with the person of Casimir IV – he was thus declared Bohemian king in May 1438 at the Calixtine diet in Mělník – *Starší letopisové čeští* [Old Bohemian Annals], p. 109 and *Aeneae Silvii Historia Bohemica – Enea Silvio Historie česká* (1998). D. Martínková – A. Hadravová – J. Matl (Eds.), Praha, KLP-Koniasch Latin Press: Ústav pro klasická studia AV ČR: Nadace pro dějiny kultury ve střední Evropě, p. 178, from the literature in the most detail, see Urbánek, R. (1915). *České dějiny III. 1. Věk poděbradský I*, pp. 304–306.
- ²² On the offer of the throne to King Wladyslaw Jagellonian, see Šmahel, F. (1993). *Husitská revoluce III.*, Univerzita Karlova, pp. 48–49; Čornej, P. (2000) *Velké dějiny země Koruny české V. (1402–1437)*, Praha – Litomyšl, Paseka, pp. 266–267.

During his reign, the Polish king addressed the key question in relationship to the Bohemian Crown, whether in the spirit of his predecessors to strive for the revindication of Silesia (with partial success at the Głogów Congress) or to gain the Bohemian throne for his dynasty. The second option won, but the Polish court wanted to achieve this through diplomatic negotiations and an agreement with Poděbrady, not at the cost of an expensive war against him. Casimir IV therefore kindly accepted the message of the League of Zelená Hora, but he took a distinctly reserved stance on their proposal. He argued for the fatigue of Poland after the just-concluded protracted thirteen-year war with the Order of the Teutonic Knights. At the same time, the Roman Curia believed that by its contribution to the conclusion of the Peace of Toruń, it had freed the Polish monarch's hands for intervention in Bohemia. Not even calling the papal legate from Wrocław, whom the envoys quickly contacted with the warning that the negotiations were not going well, helped. Casimir's response to the Bohemian proposal was an example of the sophisticated diplomacy of the Polish court. The Polish king declared that the question of the possible acceptance of the Bohemian Crown would be postponed until the meeting of the general diet, which would only be convoked in the next year. In the meantime, he would send a message to Bohemia, which would work to end or at least interrupt the ongoing war and work on George of Poděbrady to submit to the pope.²³ Casimir thus left a free path in all directions and, above all, gained time before Bohemian conditions developed more clearly.

For the League of Zelená Hora, it was a very meagre result, especially Šternberk must have felt disappointed and humiliated, since he had been so sure of Polish military aid that he did not hesitate to use information about it as a means of pressure on the Bohemian Catholics who were still hesitating.²⁴

²³ On the offer of the Bohemian crown and the position of the Polish court on the Bohemian question, see Drabina, J. (1974). *Działalność apostolskiego legata Rudolfa z Rüdesheim na Śląsku* [The activities of the apostolic legate Rudolf from Rüdesheim in Silesia], in: *Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis, Historia XXIII*, Wrocław 1974, pp. 219–220. Gorski, K. (1987). *Dyplomacja polska czasów Kazimierza Jagiellonczyka 2. Lata konfliktów dyplomatycznych* [Polish diplomacy in the times of Casimir Jagiellonian 2: Years of diplomatic conflicts]. In *Kazimierz Jagiellończyk: Zbiór studiów o Polsce drugiej połowy XV wieku*, M. Biskup – K. Górski (red.): Warszawa, pp. 234–235. On Casimir's view of sovereign legitimacy, see Piotr Węcowski, P (2013). *Ze studiów nad ideologią polityczną Kazimierza Jagiellończyka: wątek pokoju i zgody w państwie* [From studies on the political ideology of Casimir Jagiellonian: The topic of peace and harmony in the state]. *Średniowiecze Polskie i Powszechnie* 5 (9), pp. 169–184.

²⁴ In the letter to Jan of Rožmberk, Šternberk did not even hesitate to claim that the Polish kings and his wife sent through his emissary a promise to the League of rapid aid in the form of 5,000 horsemen and if there was a good crop in Poland to ensure the army, even

The League did not, however, rely only on Poland and already from 1465 had sought a possible alliance even with the imperial princes. Practically at the same time that the emissary of the League turned to King Casimir in Jihlava with the request for an early military intervention against George of Poděbrady, the League sent Hilarius Litoměřický, Linhart of Gutštejn and Jan Kocovský with a request for aid to the diet, which had been convoked by Emperor Frederick in Nuremberg to discuss the war against the Turks. Nevertheless, the League fared even worse here than it had in Krakow, although it claimed that it was not fighting for personal gain, but for the protection of the Catholic Church and the faith, which was being oppressed and trampled by the heretical ruler and his officials. Therefore, the weight of the Polish card increased again.²⁵

Casimir IV kept his promise given to the League; two months after the Krakow discussions he truly sent a mission to Bohemia. At that time, twelve castles of the League had already fallen into Poděbrady's hands and a significant part of their holdings had suffered the raids of the king's faithful aristocrats and divisions from the royal towns. The northern component of the League – the people of Wrocław and their allies suffered a cruel defeat at Frankenštejn.²⁶ The Catholic League was facing defeat. In this situation, the Polish king really achieved more for it than the pope and Emperor Frederick III.

The selection of the Polish mission was very well thought out on the part of Casimir and his counsellors; they were not only leading aristocrats and experienced diplomats, but also directly people with contacts and experience with the Bohemian milieu. Only their names must have acted as a message to the Bohemian monarch, because at the head of the mission was Jakub of Dębno (rightly called the architect of Casimir's policy towards the southern neighbours by Polish historians)²⁷

Casimir himself would come with the main Polish forces – *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské VII* [Ar] (1887). J. Kalousek (Ed.), Praha, Print of Dr. E. Grégr, p. 279, Nr. 131. It was a clear lie to scare Rožmberk, who left the League the previous year.

²⁵ *Des Heilligen Röhmisschen Reichs Teutscher Nation Reichs Tags Theatrum* (1718). J. J. Müller (Ed.), Jena, Verlag: Bielcke, pp. 260–290. On the appearance of the Bohemian delegation at the imperial diet in Nuremberg, see *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské XX* (1902), F. Dvorský (Ed.) Praha, pp. 542–550, Nr. 1.

²⁶ On the defeat of the Wrocław troops at Frankenštejn – *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), pp. 656–658; *Starí letopisové čeští*, p. 165. Urbánek, R. (1926). *Husitský král*, Praha p. 212.

²⁷ On Jakub of Dębno, see mainly Feliks Kiryk F. (1967). *Jakub z Dębna na tle wewnętrznej i zagranicznej polityki Kazimierza Jagiellończyka* [Jakub of Dębno against the background of the internal and foreign policies of Casimir Jagiellonian]. Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków, wydawctwo polskiej akademii nauk. In March 1467 and in 1468 he was sent to Prague, in 1469 to Hungary, in 1470 to the emperor and in 1471 to the grandmaster. After his calling

and Stanislaw of Ostroróg, the Calixtine paladin (son of Sudiwoj of Ostroróg, who led the Polish army to Bohemia to aid the Calixtines against Albert of Habsburg in 1438). He knew George of Poděbrady personally; he had already led a mission to the Prague court in February 1462.²⁸ The mission also included the Krakow canon Jan Długosz, whose appointment was to be an considerate step towards the League.²⁹ Their retinue comprised 300 horsemen.

On October 19, the mission arrived in Prague and the very next day George provided them with an audience. The Polish king announced that he had been urged by the papal side to start a war against George, but that he had disobeyed the call and did not intend to do so in the future either, but he called on the Bohemian king to reconcile with the pope. The first step towards that according to Casimir was to be the conclusion of a ceasefire with those who disobeyed him at the pope's call, namely with the League of Zelená Hora (King George in his written response from October 26, literally stated that he was called by Casimir "to take an armistice with those who had betrayed us...". Out of respect for the King of Poland, he expressed his willingness to discuss this proposal as well, although he made it clear that he had strong reservations and doubts.³⁰

to the Bohemian throne in 1471, he found himself in the accompaniment of Władysław Jagiellonian in Prague. He was part of the delegation negotiating with the Hungarians in 1473 in Nysa and Opava in Silesia. See further Falkowski, W. (1992). *Elita władzy w Polsce za panowania Kazimierza Jagiellończyka (1447–1492)* [The power elite in Poland under the reign of Casimir Jagiellonian (1447–1492)]. Warszawa, pp. 86–87, 121–122.

²⁸ On Stanislaw of Ostroróg, see Antoni Gąsiorowski – Jerzy Topolski (red.). *Wielkopolski Słownik Biograficzny*. Warszawa-Poznań: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1981, pp. 539–540 and Gąsiorowski, A. (1971). Polscy gwaranci traktatów z Krzyżakami XIV–XV wieku [Polish guarantors of treaties with the Teutonic Knights of the 14th–15th centuries], In *Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie nr 2–3*, 1971, p. 259. On his position of the Calixtine Palatine, see *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti* (1896). A. Sokolowski – J. Szujski (Eds.), Kraków, p. 198. In February 1462, he led the delegation to Prague. From 1463, he was a member of the Polish delegation, which led the peace discussions with the Teutonic Knights and led them in September 1466 in Toruń until the end. In 1466, he was the guarantor of the Toruń Peace. After the end of the war, Ostroróg continued to play a significant role in Polish diplomacy.

²⁹ Długosz calls the appointment an obliging move towards the League of Zelená Hora, see Kiryk F. (1967) *Jakub z Dębna*, p. 97.

³⁰ For the answer of King George to the Polish emissaries from October 1467, see *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské IV* (1846), F. Palacký (Ed.), Praha, pp. 147–150, č=Nr. 36, George exams the three main points of the Polish proposal in detail here, i.e., 1. rejection of the pope's request that Casimir act against George; 2. be reconciled with the pope. 3. end or at least interrupt the domestic war.

Now, the negotiations with the League of Zelená Hora awaited the Polish mission. The emissaries had to set out for Jihlava, where the leader of the League Zdeněk of Šternberk and his son-in-law and also creator of the initial programme of the League Jan Zajíc of Házmburk were waiting for them. They unequivocally rejected the demand to turn over the besieged castle of Šternberk, Konopiště (it was later proposed that the castle would be handed over to the Poles for the period of the ceasefire, thus a variation George himself had once tried in Hungary as a convention between Corvinus and his brothers at the castles Šariš and Rychnava); they were willing in their own interest to discuss the declaration of a ceasefire, but not for one year as proposed by King George but for a half-year – from St Martin's 1467 to St George's in 1468).³¹

The Polish plenipotentiaries proved their first valuable service to the League. Despite King George being very upset by Šternberk and Házmburk's response to his proposals, they convinced him after returning to Prague to agree at least to a short-term provisional ceasefire and provided the members of the Catholic League security safe conduct statements so they could convene at a new congress in Brzeg, Silesia. On 19 November 1467, thanks to the Polish mediation, a ceasefire was negotiated between the disputing sides from 25 November in Bohemia and from November 30, to January 25, 1468 in Moravia, Silesia, Lusatia and the Lusatian League. Fifteen members of the League of Zelená Hora confirmed with their signatures that they would faithfully maintain the ceasefire.³²

A crucial meeting in relation to the Polish candidacy and the League took place in Wrocław, which forced the site of the planned Catholic Congress to be there instead of the proposed Brzeg. On the eve of the congress, Jošt of Rožmberk died, the only one who could somewhat moderate the predatory Šternberk in his uncompromising attitude.³³ The key speech at the second Wrocław congress of the League was taken by the papal legate Rudolf of Rudesheim. The Curia did not

³¹ On the negotiations in Jihlava, see Papée, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 77 and Kíryk, F. (1967). *Jakub z Debna*, pp. 98–99.

³² The text on the ceasefire, but with another date, is printed in the *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské IV* (1846), pp. 160–162, Nr. 41. Original of the document NA Praha, *Archív České koruny*, sg. 1734.

³³ Drabina, J. (1984). *Rola argumentacji religijnej w walce politycznej w późnośredniowiecznym Wrocławiu* [The role of religious argumentation in the imaginative struggle in late-medieval Wrocław]. Kraków, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, p. 76. An overall evaluation of Jošt's activity was presented by IBID., (2012). *Droga biskupa Jodoka do niesławy* [The second bishop Jodok into infamy], In W. Iwańczak – D. Karczewski (red.), *Zwycięzy i przegrani w dziejach średniowiecznych i wczesnonowożytnych Czech i Polski*, Kraków, pp. 403–418.

intend for George to come out of the conflict with the League victorious. Rudolf's main task, therefore, was to prevent a conciliatory solution by any means possible. Despite some more considerate votes, Zdeněk of Šternberk fully supported him, and this it was decided. The League would not surrender to King George, but would resist even more resolutely. However, it was conditioned by military assistance from abroad. When the Polish emissaries Jakub of Dębno, Stanislav of Ostroróg and Jan Długosz arrived, they had to face persuasion and then the ever-increasing pressure to accept the Bohemian crown on behalf of their master. They objected that they were not authorized to do so, so they were called upon to at least declare that the Polish side would defend his son's succession and send him accompanied by one thousand riders to Wrocław.³⁴ It was no longer decisive military aid, but an effort to achieve the Polish military entry into the conflict with George of Poděbrady in the form of the thousand riders, although it would be rather symbolic in terms of strength. However, the Polish envoys adhered to the king's answer from July – he did not reject the offer of the Bohemian crown, but postponed it for discussion at the Polish general diet. The main task of the mission, however, was to achieve peace between the divided parties in Bohemia, but the League decided in Wrocław that it would accede only to a short truce and would continue the war until Poděbrady's overthrow. Such a position had already provoked an angry reaction from Jakub of Dębno and a demonstrative departure from the meeting hall, which Zdeněk of Šternberk reminded him of a year and a half later with great satisfaction (See Footnote 52).

The League of Zelená Hora was well aware that it could not succeed in the conflict with King George without substantial foreign military aid and nothing less could satisfy it. Although the Polish mission had saved it from a complete defeat and the Polish king had not rejected the offer of the Bohemian throne, only postponed it, the diplomatic answers of the Polish envoys already acted counterproductively. The fatal decision came not only in the position to George of Poděbrady, but also in the relation to Poland, in Wrocław. The Catholic lords came to the conclusion that Casimir IV could not be persuaded and would not join the war against George. On 29 December, the league sent a mission to the pope, which calculated the damages suffered by the individual lords "in defending the faith" and again asked for financial assistance.³⁵

³⁴ On the pressure on the Polish emissaries in Wrocław, see *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), p. 696. *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 208. Papée, F. (1907), *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 79.

³⁵ On the congress in Wrocław and the letter of the League to the pope, where the costs suffered are tallied, see *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), pp. 698–700.

By King Casimir refusing to support the League of Zelená Hora militarily, he lost all value in their eyes. The Bohemian Crown which it gave was to be a reward for military support, but that had not been and evidently would not be provided, the League therefore no longer felt bound by their promise to the Poles and the argument of Jagiellonian legitimism no longer interested it. The altered position of the League had not been officially expressed to Poland and if it ever planned such a communication, then only when it had gained, or rather believed that it had gained a much more energetic ally.

The lords did not intend to wait on the Polish diet and under the influence of its secular protector so far, Emperor Frederick III, who did not want such a strengthening of the House of Jagiellonian, they first addressed Brandenburg and offered the Bohemian throne to the elector Frederick Hohenzollern, but his younger brother Albrecht Achilles, whose daughter Ursula had married Poděbrady's son Henry the year before, managed deftly to lead the elector away from this plan.³⁶ However, not even this side-tracked the League from its firm, albeit purposefully secret, decision to reject the plan for Polish succession.

The Polish envoys returned to Prague. Despite learning in Wrocław that Poděbrady's opponents were not really interested in a real peace, they completed their mission, at least by ensuring a short-term ceasefire. On January 25, 1468, in the name of their lord Casimir IV, they concluded a ceasefire between King George and the rebellious lords and prelates until 25 April.³⁷

After the failure with the Brandenburg elector, the League of Zelená Hora tried to draw a Hungarian card. When the new member of the league, Bishop of Olomouc Tas, successfully established his first contacts at the Hungarian court, Zdeněk of Šternberk met King Matyáš Korvín in Trnava in March 1468. The long-awaited help from abroad, without which part of the League (both Zajics

³⁶ On the contacting of the Brandenburgs, see *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis III. Sammlung der Urkunden, Chroniken und sonstigen Geschichtsquellen für die Geschichte der Mark Brandenburg und ihrer Regenten* (1843). Riedel (ed.), Berlin, p. 454. On the roles of Albrecht Achilles in this affair, see Höfler, K. (1860) *Frankische Studien IV, Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichtsquellen VII*, Bd. 25, Wien, pp. 42–43.

³⁷ The original of the letter is deposited in the NA Praha, fond: Archiv České koruny, sg.1734. The labelling of George of Poděbrady with the title of king was seen by the Roman Curia as not respecting the papal decree on 23 December 1466. In contrast, Zdeněk of Šternberk insisted that he would be labelled in the text as the Supreme Burgrave of Prague, although King George removed him from this post in April 1467. The cities of Wrocław, Pilsen, Olomouc, Brno, Znojmo and Jihlava was also mentioned in the contract on the part of the Catholic league. From the literature, see on the assessment of this Polish mission Nowak, A. (2017). *Dzieje Polski. Tom 3. 1340–1468. Królestwo zwycieskiego orla*. Kraków, Biały Kruk, p. 431.

of Hasenburk and others) would clearly have remained in a ceasefire with George of Poděbrady, came from the Hungarian king.³⁸

On April 8, 1468, Matthias Corvinus declared himself the protector of all Catholics in the Bohemian Crown, thus assuming the role which the League had requested of King Casimir the year before. Yet not even then did the League declare that it no longer felt tied to the promise of the Bohemian throne to the House of Jagiellonian.³⁹

At the same time, King Matthias, still in April, announced to Casimir that he had accepted protectorship of the Catholics in the Bohemian Crown. Casimir could not officially object to this. Moreover, Corvinus's emissary Protasius (Tas) of Boskovice at an audience in Krakow announced that the Hungarian king did not plan to impede the succession of Casimir's sons in Bohemia. Tas could have given the impression that nothing had changed in the position of the Bohemian Catholic League and that the plan of Jagiellonian succession after Poděbrady was dethroned or dead persisted. It would not even be tactical in a situation where the Polish king warned Bishop Tas that he did not reject the offer of the Bohemian throne, but merely postponed it to discussion by the general diet. The Jagiellonian was even called upon to support Corvinus in his war against George (although it was not stated aloud, it was communicated subliminally, after all, he would be fighting for the inheritance of his sons). It was another attempt to drag the Polish king into the war. It was again unsuccessful, just like Corvinus's request for the hand of Casimir's daughter Hedwig.⁴⁰

³⁸ Prochaska, A. (1914). *Protazego biskupa poselstwo do Polski r. 1471* [Protasius the bishop's mission to Poland in 1471]. *Rozprawy Akademii Umiejętności*. Wydział Historyczno-Filozoficzny. t. 31, 1914, p. 2, even attributed Tas with the main credit in the alliance of the League of Zelená Hora with Corvinus.

³⁹ Corvinus's declaration as the defender of the Bohemian Catholics in *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum IX*. (1874), p. 262 – Corvinus's manifest from April 1468, *ibid.* List Brněnské městské rady do Vratislavi [Letter of the Brno Town Council to Vratislaus] *Království dvojího lidu*, p. 176, Nr. 80: “*pan Matyáš, král uherský, nás, kteříž jsme byli římské stolice a Koruny české poslušnými poddanými, do své milostivé královské ochrany vzal a nám se zavázal, že nám podporu a pomoc, jaká mi jen bude možná, ráčí poskytnout*” [Lord Matthias, king of Hungary, took us, who were obedient subjects of the Roman throne and the Bohemian Crown, into his merciful royal protection and undertook to give us the support and aid as soon as possible].

⁴⁰ *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), pp. 218–219; *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd. 2. (2003), p. 721 – it was meant to be Eschenloer. From the literature, see Prochaska, A. (1913), *Protazego biskupa poselstwo do Polski r. 1471*. Kraków, Nakładem Akademii umiejętności, p. 2. and Papeé, F. (1907), *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 86.

The House of Jagiellonian continued to build on neutrality, but the legate Rudolf of Rüdeshheim repeatedly complained in letters to Rome that the Poles, despite the pope having deposed and exiled George of Poděbrady from the church, continued to call him king and pay homage to him.⁴¹

As in the previous year, the Polish court offered its mediation in the Bohemian war. This time it was George of Poděbrady and not his opponents who urgently needed a truce. King Casimir sent the tested Jakub of Dębno and Stanislaw of Ostroróg on another mission, instead of Jan Długosz the castellan of Oświęcim Mikołaj Skop was now installed. After a stop in Prague, they headed for Olomouc, where King Mathias and most of the founding members of the League of Zelená Hora were then. For the first time, it was openly confronted with the fact that in Matthias it had gained not only a protector but also a strict master. The members of the League heard very reprimanding words from Corvinus for the lack of military support in the war against the heretic George, only Šternberk passed the muster in Mathias's eyes. Corvinus rejected Poděbrady's proposal for Casimir IV to be appointed as the referee in the conflict between him and the Hungarian king, with the justification that he could not take such a commitment without the consent of the pope and the emperor. Immediately afterwards, both papal legates appeared, which conditioned Poděbrady's proposal for a ceasefire with handing over his crucial supports (Prague, Karlštejn, Klodzko, Hradiště, Špilberk) into the hands of the Catholic league, while the Polish envoys still had to commit that if Poděbrady did not fulfil this commitment, the Polish king and Mathias Corvinus would intervene militarily. The Poles vehemently rejected such a promise and left Olomouc, for which they earned a number of derisive remarks from Bishop Tas.⁴² It must have been clear to Casimir's skilful diplomats that the League of Zelená Hora was already completely under Corvinus's influence and could not be utilised in any way for Polish interests.

Nevertheless, Krakow was not prepared for what role the League of Zelená Hora would play in the question of taking control of the Bohemian throne the next year. A new Polish delegation, in which Jakub of Dębno again stood at the head,

⁴¹ The proof of that was also the formulation of the document on the conclusion of a ceasefire with the League of Zelená Hora, see Note 32. The letter of Lorenz Blumenau, plenipotentiary of the Order of the Teutonic Knights in Rome at his superiors in Malbork in the Royal Archive, printed in *Codex epistolaris III*, Nr. 112. Later, Paul II still blames King Casimir for forbidding the declaration of a crusade and also limited the appearance of his legate at the diet in Piotrkow, Papée, F. (1907), *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 86.

⁴² *Joannis Długossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 229. Emperor Frederick III was also informed on the Polish delegation and its proposals in Olomouc, see *Regesta imperii XIII, Heft 21*, (2006). E. Holtz (Ed.), Wien, n. 109.

was sent to Rome, but at the same time it was to enter the negotiations between King George and Matthias Corvinus, whose successes in the war until then were shaken by the debacle of the February campaign near Vilémov. In April 1469, the Poles again arrived in Olomouc, which had transformed into Corvinus's main base. King George then settled in Moravský Šternberk with a large entourage, and negotiations took place between the two monarchs on the possibilities of ending the military conflict. The leader of the Polish mission, on behalf of his lord Casimir IV, again offered the possibility of Jagiellonian mediation and warned both kings not to do anything against the interests of the Kingdom of Poland and its ruler. The Polish envoys not only contacted King Matthias, but also came to the meeting of the League of Zelená Hora. Here, they found out to their shock that the Bohemian Catholic lords no longer felt any obligations to the Jagiellonian dynasty and would freely elect a new king. There was a sharp exchange of views between Zdeněk of Šternberk and Jakub of Dębno. The leader of the Catholic league reminded the Polish aristocrat that they had once offered Casimir's plenipotentiaries exactly what they were now asking for and were turned away. It was nothing surprising, Šternberk had negotiated much more arrogantly a few days ago with Poděbrady's emissaries Petr Kdulinec of Ostroměř and Beneš of Weitmile.⁴³ In response, the indignant lord of Dębno warned George of Poděbrady that the Catholic league was preparing to elect a Bohemian anti-king, namely Matthias Corvinus.⁴⁴ In vain.

The League of Zelená Hora had already thanks to Zdeněk of Šternberk embarked on a path from which it did not see the opportunity to depart from. It was completely reluctant to sacrifice itself in the event of a reconciliation between King George and Matthias. In that case, the Poles would not help it militarily, and it was not interested in anything else at the moment.

On 3 May, Corvinus was declared King of Bohemia and the members of the League of Zelená Hora were appointed the supreme land officials. The Olomouc election was a double-cross not only for George of Poděbrady, but also for the Poles,

⁴³ On the stay and activities of the Polish emissaries in Olomouc, see Prochaska, A. (1913). *Królowie Kazimierz Jagiellończyk a Jerzy czeski* [King Casimir of Jagiellonian and the Bohemian George]. In *Przegląd Historyczny: dwumiesięcznik naukowy*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo DiG., Warszawa, pp. 142–144. On their meeting with the leaders of the League and the verbal confrontation of Zdeněk of Šternberk and Jakub of Dębno, see Kyrik, *Jakub z Dębno*, p. 82. Šternberk's negotiations with Poděbrady's emissaries – Palacký, F. (1921). *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě*, pp. 988–989.

⁴⁴ *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 244. From the literature, see Palacký, F. (1921). *Dějiny národu českého v Čechách a v Moravě*, p. 991 and Kyrik, F. (1967). *Jakub z Debna*, p. 110. On the circumstances of the Olomouc election, see *Fontes rerum Austriacarum XX* (1860), pp. 580–584.

who had saved the League from a military defeat a year and a half ago. The Polish envoys (besides Jakub of Debno also the dean of Krakow Pawel of Główno) immediately expressed a strong protest against Corvinus's election and called it illegitimate. Then, without delay, they left Olomouc and hurried to complete their mission by visiting Rome and the pope, as entrusted to them. Now they had another difficult task - to prevent the Pope from confirming Corvinus' election. The chronicler Dlugosz did not forget to remind that was Olomouc subsequently struck by a great fire - as if God himself was angry at the betrayal of the House of Jagiellonian.⁴⁵

After an agreement with Matthias Corvinus, the League of Zelená Hora sent their own delegation to Krakow in June led by the freshly appointed Bohemian chancellor Jan Zajíc of Házmburk and the brother of the Olomouc bishop Dobeš of Boskovice. Jan Zajíc represented the more cultured face of the League, for years he worked as the supreme court judge and, unlike Šternberk, he had an abundance not only of eloquence, but also of tact. Now this dextrous lawyer was trying to assuage Polish outrage and was offering Corvinus's marriage to Polish Princess Hedwig.⁴⁶ He failed here, but the message was not received as harshly as might have been expected. If the depiction by Jan Dlugosz was faithful, the experienced politician and lawyer Jan Zajíc then allowed his emotions to overwhelm him and supposedly even cried when he was introduced to Casimir's handsome sons, whom he himself had denied the Bohemian throne by his participation at the Olomouc election.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ On Corvinus's election in Olomouc, see the letter of Kašpar Kobr to Wrocław in *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum*. Bd. 13. (1893), pp. 3–4, Nr.5. From the literature Papée, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 97; Urbánek, *Husitský král*, pp. 255–257; Heymann, G.F. *George of Bohemia*, pp. 524–533. On the fire in Olomouc, see *Joannnis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 244. Although the curia welcomed with enormous joy that Matthias had seized the performance of a crusade against King George, it did not rush in any way with recognizing Corvinus - the papacy feared precisely the reaction of Poland. None of the European sovereigns recognised Corvinus's royal title in 1469.

⁴⁶ A comparison of Dlugosz's description of Zajíc's mission, see *Joannnis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), pp. 246–248, is offered by the description of *Peter Escheloer, Geschichte der Stadt Breslau II* (2003), p. 769. The question of the degree and motivation of the distortion in the works of both authors was dealt with by Urbánek, R. (1915). *České dějiny III. 1.*, p. 15. From the literature on this mission, see also Kalous, A. (2007) *Služba Boskovických u Matyáše Korvína* [The service of the Boskovice family at Matthias Corvinus], In *Sborník prací historických XXI, Acta Univesitatit Palackianae Olomucensis, Facultas philosophica, Historica 3*, pp. 89–91 and *ibid.*, (2007). *Matyáš Korvín. Uherský a český král* [Matthias Corvinus: Hungarian and Bohemian king]. České Budějovice, Veduta, p. 152.

⁴⁷ On the person of Jan Zajíc, see Martin Šandera, M. (2016). *Jan Zajíc z Házmburka. Tvůrce programu a hlavní diplomat Zelenohorské jednoty* [Jan Zajíc of Házmburk: Creator of the programme and main diplomat of the League of Zelená Hora], In *Východočeské listy historické 36*, pp. 21–42. P. Čornej - M. Bartlová (2007), *Velké dějiny země Koruny české VI*, p. 263.

Nevertheless, F. Papeé assessed the results of the mission as relatively successful, the envoys of the League prepared to depart Krakow with the encouraging awareness that Poland did not intend to act itself against Corvinus, nor support the heretic George militarily or financially. The turning point only came when the emissaries of King George arrived, who informed the Poles that the Bohemian diet had expressed consent for Prince Vladislaus to become Poděbrady's successor on the Bohemian throne. Házmburk was completely taken aback. According to Długosz, he expressed regret over the Olomouc election and advised the king himself to accept the Prague election, if George would place Prague and Karlštejn in the hands of the Poles as a guarantee of his promise. Such a proposal had its justification, the Poles would have the crown jewels in their power and the place of the coronation, but Zajíc knew very well that Poděbrady would never accept such a demand. Jan Długosz even put a very surprising statement in the mouth of the lord of Házmburk that perhaps his lord Matthias Corvinus would have given up on the Czech throne if the Polish king had met him in his demand for marriage to Princess Hedwig. However, this would have clearly surpassed the scope of his mission, and if it was not a pre-arranged tactic with King Matthias, it could even have been dangerous for Zajíc. However, the Polish monarch certainly did not intend to accommodate Corvinus in this matter. The mission thus failed on two key points – to make Poland look more favourably on the Olomouc election, and to reach an agreement on Matthias's marriage to Hedwig Jagiellonian.⁴⁸

After his return to his main Bohemian residence in Budyně nad Ohří, Jan Zajíc was besieged by the army of Poděbrady's son, Prince Henry, Duke of Münsterberg-Oels, and only with luck escaped captivity.⁴⁹ This was followed by a surprisingly successful campaign by Henry's army, which crushed the Lusatian near Zittau and then triumphantly extended itself through almost all of Silesia in September. Corvinus himself was defeated by Prince Henry near Uherské Hradiště in November 1469. Poděbrady's political weight suddenly increased. The vision of the Polish succession to the Bohemian throne took on new promising outlines.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), s. 248. From the literature, see Papeé, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 100.

⁴⁹ On the siege of Budyně, see Sedláček, A. (1999) *Hrady, zámky a tvrze království českého XIV*, Praha, Argo, p. 19.

⁵⁰ On Corvinus's defeat at Uherské Hradiště, see *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), pp. 253–254; Of the earlier Bohemian annals, see edd. Jaroslav Kašpar – Jaroslav Porák, synoptically Frankenberg, O.(1960). *Husitské válečnictví po Lipanech* [Hussite warcraft after Lipany], Praha, pp. 110–112.

The Polish court employed a new tactic. It pressured George of Poděbrady to transfer the reign to Prince Vladislaus still during his lifetime, but at the same time tried to force the rebellious Bohemian Catholic lords to put down their arms under threat of war with Poland. While the Polish military engagement did not occur, King Casimir continued to rely on diplomacy, but his emissaries energetically proclaimed the Jagiellonian claims to the Bohemian throne in Rome and in the affiliated lands of the Crown and before all of Matthias's supporters. Wrocław was the most shocked, which suddenly faced economic sanctions and even the threat of a military intervention on the part of Poland, namely at the time when the reports of Corvinus's defeat near Uherské Hradiště were coming in.⁵¹

The League of Zelená Hora became anxious. The future suddenly seemed quite uncertain; Poděbrady was not on his knees and they had made the Poles their enemies. It was felt also by the leader of the League himself, when he was confronted with Polish diplomats in a very interesting way in the summer of 1470. The new Polish delegation led by Jakub of Dębno and Stanislaw of Šidlovice asked Zdeněk of Šternberk as Corvinus's supreme captain in Bohemia for a security safe conduct on the way to Prague. They received it, but its wording infuriated them, because Šternberk conditioned the safe conduct with a commitment that the envoys would do nothing in Bohemia against his master Matthias Corvinus, whom he called the Bohemian king. From Šternberk's point of view, his actions were logical – he was bound by a loyalty oath to King Matthias, why he should make it easier for his enemies to unite against him (on the other hand, no hostility was officially declared between Corvinus and the Jagiellonians). The Polish envoys objected to this condition in the safe conduct in a letter dated 11 August in a field near Malenovice in Moravia, because they found King George here at the head of the army, with whom he was launching a new campaign against Corvinus. Absolutely characteristically they omitted in their complaint Corvinus's Bohemian royal title and reminded Zdeněk that he himself had recognized the son of their lord Casimir as the king of Bohemia two years ago. The tone of the letter was really sharp and far from diplomatic language (but with the intentions of the Polish court to speak vigorously with the rebellious Catholic aristocrats in order to warn or threaten – “And other Christian kings and princes know you as such, who rise up against peace and tranquillity in the Kingdom of Bohemia”). Šternberk defended himself against this with his own special arrogance and called the complaint of the Polish envoys unfounded. Namely, he addressed Jan of Dębno with the reminder that

⁵¹ On the Polish pressure, see Papée, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 113. On the moods in Silesia, see *Peter Eschenloer: Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd. 2. (2003), p. 798.

it was he who, despite the urging of the Bohemian lords, the legate and the bishop of Olomouc, refused to clearly accept the offer of the Bohemian throne for his master and angrily left the negotiation hall. Zdeněk's letter expressed all the essential points by which the League justified the rejection of Jagiellonian succession. Corvinus had been elected in a free election of the representatives of the aristocracy, clergy and towns, fulfilling the mission of a true Christian king to suppress the Bohemian heresy and return the Bohemians to obedience to the Church. The only one who can make League change its position is the Holy Father in Rome.⁵²

The League of Zelená Hora, which had offered the House of Jagiellonian the Bohemian royal crown in 1466–1467, was now to find itself in the completely opposite role – as an organization that is working hard to prevent the Jagiellonians from acceding to the Bohemian throne.⁵³ It was well aware that if the Jagiellonians had been successfully brought to the Bohemian throne by Poděbrady's party, then the Utraquists would have maintained the positions they had acquired during the reign of George of Poděbrady for many years.

Two years before, Poland politically sbacked the League of Zelená Hora. Now Polish envoys called on it to maintain a ceasefire; otherwise, they threatened war. Silesian Catholics in particular began to lose heart, the Wrocław chronicler Eschenloer even wrote about a darkened sky, in which the only shining star remained Zdeněk of Šternberk.⁵⁴ However, the intensified political involvement of the Polish court in the Bohemian question also had its pitfalls. Šternberk had spies at the Prague court and was informed that Poděbrady and his close advisors were strongly upset by the new mission, in which Jakub of Dębno and Stanisław Szydłowiecki asked the Bohemian king to resign still during his life in favour of

⁵² On the Polish protest, see *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské III* (1844), p. 578, Nr. 798. Šternberk's response from 16 August 1470 has been preserved in the court copy from the State Regional Archive Třeboň, fond: Historica Třeboň, inv. Nr. 2978, sg. 2408. The text of both documents is presented also by Peter Eschenloer. *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd. 2. (2003), pp. 812–814 (letter of the Poles) and p. 817 response of Zdeněk of Šternberk. Kiryk, F. (1967), *Jakub z Dębna*, p. 123. labelled the letter "mocny w tonie, neirezadko pelen grózb..." [powerful in tone, not uncommonly full of threats].

⁵³ The mission of Jan Zajíc to Poland was not by far the only diplomatic activity of the League of Zelená Hora ater the Olomouc election, especially in relation to the imperial princes the propaganda campaign did not slow down and in a number of letters tendentially magnified the successes of Corvinus from Moravian battlefields – *Fontes rerum Austriacarum XX* (1860), pp. 635–637.

⁵⁴ On the Polish threats to Vratislav, see Peter Eschenloer. *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), s. 794–795. Papéé, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 113. Grünhaagen, C. (1884). *Geschichte Slesiens I*, Gotha, pp. 93–4.

Vladislaus and consent to his coronation. The League attempted to take advantage of the temporary cooling of the relations between Krakow and Prague, affected also by the rejection of Vladislaus's marriage to Ludmila.⁵⁵

Zdeněk of Šternberk was very happy to provide his castle in Polná near the Bohemian-Moravian border for the meeting of Poděbrady's envoys. He himself, Jan Zajíc of Házmburk and Tas of Boskovice, as Corvinus's agents, did everything here so that the Polish prince would not sit on the Bohemian throne. They came up with much more accommodating proposals than the Poles, George could rule until the end of his life, his son would become the Margrave of Moravia, and in the future the possible path to his succession to the Bohemian throne would not be closed if Corvinus died without descendants.⁵⁶ When the land diet in Prague expressed willingness to deal with these proposals, the Polish court was frightened. It seemed that the existing tactic of neutrality and waiting until the Bohemian throne falls into the lap of the Jagiellonians without a fight, thus the plan pushed for years and the supreme diplomatic work of Jakub of Dębno, would be thwarted at the last moment.

The architect and creator himself was to save it: Jakub of Dębno was sent to Prague again to prevent the acceptance of Corvinus's proposals. The demand and pressure for Poděbrady's abdication in favour of Vladislaus had evidently had to be revoked. There is no certainty about what the Polish envoys promised at the St. Valentine's Land Diet in Prague. Fryderik Papeé believed that they had purposefully put into play the promise of Vladislaus's marriage to Poděbrady's daughter Ludmila. But the very suggestion that the Bohemian Diet at least wait with a decisive opinion until they see how the Polish mission came out, which was going to Rome to submit proposals for the pope's reconciliation with King George, impressed the Bohemian estates.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ On this mission, see Papée, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p.113 and Kiryk, F. (1967), *Jakub z Dębna*, p. 122. Macek, J. (1965) On the foreign policy of George of Poděbrady, In *Československý časopis historický* 13, pp. 37–43.

⁵⁶ The negotiations in Polná were subjected to a new analysis by Čornej, P. (2011). *Jednání v Polné (Kapitolka z dějin tzv. druhé husitské války)* [The negotiations in Polná: Chapter from the history of the so-called Second Hussite War]. *Světla a stíny husitství. (Události – osobnosti – texty – tradice). Výběr z úvah a studií*, Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, Praha, pp. 286–296.

⁵⁷ Papée, F. (1907). *Zabiegi o czeską koronę*, p. 124. The possibility of a temporary concession in the question of Poděbrady's daughter is admitted also by Kiryk, F. (1967), *Jakub z Dębna*, pp. 124–125 and Tobolka, Z.V. *Styky krále českého s králem polským Kazimírem* [Contacts of the Bohemian King with the Polish King Casimir], p. 37.

The League of Zelená Hora did not twiddle its thumbs, after the premature death of King George (22 March 1471) Jan of Házmburk notified the Bohemian royal towns, tried to discourage them from the idea of the acceptance of the Polish prince as the new sovereign and lean towards recognition of Corvinus.⁵⁸

Zdeněk of Šternberk, Jan Zajíc of Házmburk, Jindřich of Hradec, Jan of Rožmberk and other representatives of the League tried to speak in Corvinus's favour even at the electoral diet in Kutná Hora. Šternberk even interfered several times in the speech of the bishop of Eger Jan, the main speaker of the Hungarian delegation, when he saw that the Hungarian prelate was not convincing the gathered Bohemian estates with his speech, but entirely in vain. The representatives of the League Zdeněk of Šternberk, Jan of Rožmberk and Jindřich of Hradec were the only ones, who did not vote for Prince Vladislaus. Paradoxically, the goal he had once called to realise had now been fulfilled. The heretic king was dead and a Catholic Pole was elected in his place. But it took place with the votes of the opponents of the League. A dream come true was suddenly a nightmare.⁵⁹

The threat of Polish military intervention arose before the Bohemian Catholics much more realistically than in 1470, they would no longer face not only the forces of an isolated "heretical" king, but also, as they feared, a massive military campaign of Poles, who, after an easy passage through weakened Silesia, nothing would stand in their way anymore of throwing themselves onto their estates. They had no idea that Poland was still weak financially.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ See the letters of Jan of Házmburk to the royal dowry towns – SOKA Hradec Králové, fond Archiv města Hradec Králové, inv. Nr. 39.

⁵⁹ *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 282, which Jan of Házmburk paradoxically did not mention among those who did not vote for Vladislaw. See further *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti* (1896), pp. 250–251. From the Bohemian sources, see *Staré letopisy české z křížovnického rukopisu*, p. 282; Kapavíková, M. – Vaněk, L. *Volba Vladislava Jagellonského českým králem: Edice pamětního zápisu v kutnohorské knize sentencí z roku 1471* [The Election of Wladyslaw Jagiellonian as Bohemian King: Edition of the memorial entry in the Kutná Hora Book of Sentences from 1471]. Kutná Hora 1972. For the text of the electoral conditions sent to Krakow, see Zápis krále Vladislava stavům království Českého na své volení vydaný [Entry issued by King Wladyslaw to the estates of the Bohemian kingdom on his election] – *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské IV* (1846), p. 454, Nr. 11. Macek, J. *Jagellonský věk v českých zemích I*, pp. 181–182, 185 and 226. The view from the Polish viewpoint was presented by Heck, R. (1972). *Elekcja Kutnohorska 1471 roku* [Election of Kutná Hora in 1471], In *Ślaski Kwartalnik Historyczny*, Sobótka 27, pp 198–199.

⁶⁰ Baczkowski, K. (1982). *Walka Jagiellonów z Maciejem Korwinem o koronę czeska* [The War of the Jagiellonians with Matthias Corvinus for the Bohemian Crown], p. 34.

After his first outburst of rage and forced anti-coronation in Jihlava (paradoxically in a town where according to Glugosz the League of Zelená Hora in May 1467 was to elect Casimir King of Bohemia in May 1467), Corvinus sobered up and tried to gain at least time in relation to Poland and delay a possible military confrontation. Even the League itself, after the spring hostile agitation, set a much more diplomatic tone in relation to Poland. Its representatives placed their hopes on a mission to the Polish in July 1471. It was led by the tested diplomat, Bishop Tas of Boskovice.⁶¹ He found the Polish royal court in Krakow; discussions were held there from 9 to 12 July. In addition to Corvinus's propositions, which included the traditional request for the hand of Polish Princess Hedwig and a proposal to refer the whole dispute to the pope, Bishop Tas interpreted on behalf of the League of Zelená Hora a request that Prince Vladislaus not expel the Catholic lords from their holdings when he enters Bohemia. The proposals did not meet with any understanding, Tas received the answer that Vladislaus is the rightful heir to the Bohemian throne and there is no reason why he should move towards any adjudication by the pope or any other authority in the matter of the Bohemian kingdom. The Jagiellonians were not interested in exiling the lords of the League of Zelená Hora from the land but wanted their obedience. Four years ago, Casimir IV through his mediation had negotiated a truce for them during a critical period, but they could not appreciate the gift and the Polish king has no obligation to guarantee them anything now.⁶² With reference to Vladislaus's election by the Bohemian land diet, the will of the majority of the Bohemians and the hereditary claims of the Jagiellonians to the Bohemian Crown, the Polish court invited or rather summoned the lords of the League of Zelená Hora to Vladislaus's Prague coronation.⁶³ Of course, none of them dared to do that.

⁶¹ The text of the proposals submitted in Krakow Peter Eschenloer. *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), pp. 834–839. *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, I.2.*, (1876). J. Szujski (Ed.). Kraków, Wydawnictwo Komisji historycznej Akademii Umiejetności, pp. 252–256. See on this mission in detail Prochaska, A. (1913), *Protazego biskupa poselstwo do Polski r. 1471*. Kraków 1913, pp.1–19, which analysed in detail also the questions of the possible distortion of the content of Corvinus's proposals by the Wrocław chronicler. A synoptic summary of the course and results was presented by Baczkowski, K. (1982). *Walka*, pp. 41–43.

⁶² The response of King Casimir given to Bishop Tas is in *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské IV* (1846), pp. 455–456 and *Codex epistolaris saeculi decimi quinti, I.2* pp. 253–256.

⁶³ Peter Eschenloer. *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), p. 838. On that, see also *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum*. Bd.14. *Politische Correspondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter des Königs Matthias Corvinus*. Abt. 2: 1479–1490 (1894). B. Kronthal – H. Wendt, (Eds.), Breslau, p. 4.

There could even have been the first open confrontation of the League of Zelená Hora with Polish forces, Zdeněk of Šternberk and his armigers were with Corvínus's troops, which blocked Prince Vladislaus's peaceful journey to Bohemia through Moravian territory. However, there was no military clash, the Poles did not want to risk the complications that could mean the foiling of the coronation and chose a longer but safer route through Silesia and Kłodzko.⁶⁴

As soon as Vladislaus entered Bohemian soil in August, Zdeněk of Šternberk, along with many of Matthias's other supporters, declared war on him.⁶⁵ Paradoxically, the leader of the League of Zelená Hora at the same time used the services of Polish mercenaries. Casimir's ban on hiring soldiers against George of Poděbrady evidently was not sufficiently respected in Poland. Šternberk deployed the Polish garrison under the leadership of the Bohemian captain Jan Bílý in the town of České Budějovice. However, the Poles did not prove themselves here; the only rarely paid salary soon led them to stop distinguishing between the territory of Vladislaus's and Corvínus's supporters and to carry out raids on the nearby Rožmberk holdings. All of Matthias's supporters there were greatly relieved when the Polish mercenaries were withdrawn from there in 1472.⁶⁶

The League of Zelená Hora's fears of Poland were significantly tempered by the failure of the expedition of Vladislaus's younger brother Prince Casimir into Hungary. On January 18, 1472 Matthias Corvínus with malicious joy informed

⁶⁴ On the journey of the Poles through Kłodzko, see *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 286. Also *Scriptores rerum Silesiacarum*. Bd. III. *Samuel Benjamin Klose's Darstellung der inneren Verhältnisse der Stadt Breslau vom Jahre 1458 bis zum Jahre 1526*. (1847). G. A. Stenzel (Ed). Breslau, p. 355. On Vladislaus's welcome in Kłodzko, see also Šmahel, F. (2009). Korunovační rituály, ceremonie a festivity české stavovské monarchie 1471–1526 [Coronation rituals, ceremonies and festivities of the Bohemian estates' monarchy, 1471–1526], in: *Colloquia medievalia Pragensia 12*, Praha 2009, p. 154. From the literature, see Backowski, K. (1982). *Walka*, p. 44.

⁶⁵ On the declaration of war by Šternberk and others, see *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), pp. 285–286. From the literature, see Kalous, A. (2007). *Matyáš Korvín*, p. 144.

⁶⁶ On 11 March 1471 Jan of Rožmberk literally wrote: “Poláci z Budějovic nekřesťansky hubie panstvie mé“ [The Poles from Budějovice are destroying my estate in an unchristian way] *Archív český V*, pp. 313–314, Nr. 4. He complained to Jan Bílý that upon entry to Trhové Sviny his soldiers did not only take drink but also “took what they could carry”. For Markvart's letter to the Krumlov burgrave from 24 May 1471, see *Archív český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské V* (1846), pp. 322–323, Nr. 17. „Poláci na panstvie tvého pána opěť picovati a lidem tvého pána škoditi budú“ [Poles on the estate of your lord will disturb the peace again and harm the people of your lord].

Zdeněk of Šternberk on the debacle of the Polish army near Nitra.⁶⁷ The League was able to find confirmation here that it really had chosen correctly when it turned away from the Jagiellonian candidacy in 1468.

However, the league was in no hurry for offensive actions on Bohemian territory, and the temporary occupation of Kolín and Nymburk by Corvinus's troops took place without its contribution.⁶⁸ České Budějovice was subject to its influence, it also had support in Pilsen, there was also the powerful Cheb and plenty of castles in South and Western Bohemia. Itself, it remained at the defence of its own holdings and preferred purely regional interests. The young King Vladislaus had no desire or means to begin a lengthy and costly siege of their strongholds.⁶⁹

It suited the League of Zelená Hora that the dispute between Corvinus and Vladislaus ever more moved to the field of diplomacy. During the negotiations between the Polish, Hungarian and Bohemian sides in Nysa and Opava, the League played only an insignificant role and was pushed by Corvinus to an increasingly subordinate position, although the text of the Treaty of Nysa included the signature of Dobrohost of Ronšperk.⁷⁰ It did not move beyond the request of the pope's

⁶⁷ Psaní česká krále Matyáše, *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské VI*, (1872), p. 49, Nr. 7 – „Také milý pane Zdeňku píšeme, že jak sme živý, nikdy jsme hlupějších, lenivějších, opilejších nestatečnějších a putanějších neviděli, jako sú páni Polané byli. A tuto ceduli přečta, věřimeť, že třikrát na jedné noze pro nás pokočíš“ [Dear Lord Zdeněk, we also write that as we are alive, we have never seen stupider, lazier, more drunken, less brave and more wandering, than the lords of the Poles were. And when you read this sign, we believe that you will jump for us three times on one leg]. From the literature, an apt outline of this campaign was given by Baczkowski, K. (2014). *Między czeskim utrakwizmem a rzymską ortodoksią czyli walka Jagiellonów z Maciejem Korwinem o koronę czeską w latach 1471–1479* [Between Bohemian Utraquism and Roman Orthodoxy, i.e. the fight between the Jagiellonians and Matthias Corvinus for the Bohemian crown in 1471–1479], Oświęcim, pp. 59–70.

⁶⁸ The source for the siege of Kolín and Nymburk is *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 316. From the literature Palacký (1921), *Dějiny národu českého*, p. 1042; Vorel, P. (1999). *Páni z Pernštejna*, Rybka Publishers, pp. 67–68. Vávra, J. (2014). *Dějiny královského města Kolína nad Labem do roku 1618* [The History of the Royal Town of Kolín nad Labem till 1618]. Praha, Argo, p. 86.

⁶⁹ Šandera, M. (2020). The Bohemian Royal Towns (Pilsen, České Budějovice, Cheb) under the Power of Matthias Corvinus. In *Mesto a dejiny*, 9/1, Košice, pp. 6–44.

⁷⁰ The text of the resolution of the Nysa congress is in the *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské IV* (1846), pp. 460–465, Nr. 14. Biskup, M. – Górski, K. (1987). *Kazimierz Jagiellonczyk. Zbiór studiów o Polsce drugiej połowy XV wieku* [Casimir Jagiellonian: A collection of studies on Poland in the second half of the 15th century]. Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe, p. 239. See on the Opava congress the relation of Jošt (Jobst) of Einsidle to the Margrave of Brandenburg Albrecht Achilles – *Urkundliche Nachträge zur österreichische-deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter Kaiser Friedrich III.* (1892), pp. 209–210,

arbitration role. It had already denied the emperor a similar role, although it had once happily derived legitimacy from him for its secular resistance to King George. Although it outwardly rejected Vladislaus's right to be Bohemian king and had to obey Corvinus's orders, in reality it preferred to seek a peaceful form of coexistence with the Jagiellonian party in Bohemia and did not threaten the Jagiellonian and his followers in their dominant positions in the centre and east of the land. Both parties took part in the administration of the kingdom, and Zdeněk of Šternberk and Jan Zajíc of Házmburk also worked regularly next to the son of the dead heretical king, Prince Henry in the established offices of land directors, who were to oversee the enforcement of law and the peaceful settlement of disputes between the two parties.⁷¹

It is no wonder that at the courts of Corvinus's opponents the idea germinated to seek precisely in the lords of the League of Zelená Hora the possible changeable link in Corvinus's power on the territory of the Bohemian Crown. It was not easy, despite several rifts between Corvinus and Zdeněk of Šternberk the League was still subject to Matthias and did not see a sufficient motivation to change its orientation. Nevertheless, the example of the former founding member of the League, Burian of Gutštejn, showed that even on the Jagiellonian side, even a former opponent of Poděbrady can make a career and make a significant profit in terms of property.⁷²

At the turn of 1473 and 1474, the international situation began to change to Corvinus's disadvantage – the old plan for a coalition of the Jagiellonians and the emperor against Matthias Corvinus truly received outlines.⁷³ With the awareness

Nr. 198. From the narrative sources, see mainly *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), pp. 300–302. On the position of the land directors and correctors, see Pelant, J. (1981). *České zemské sněmy v letech 1471–1500* [Bohemian Land Diets in 1471–1500]. In: *Sborník archivních prací* 31, p. 346.

⁷¹ For the minutes of the Benešov Diet, see *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské IV* (1846), p. 472, Nr. 18, here also the decree on the institution of the land directors.

⁷² On Burian of Gutštejn in Wladyslaw's services, see Macek, J. (2001). *Jagellonský věk v českých zemích 1.2*. [The Jagiellonian Age in the Czech Lands 1:2], pp. 227, 248 – Wladyslaw i.a. confirmed to Burian also the holding of the castle in Tachov, although he lacked any legal prerequisite to it. – Sedláček, A. (1998). *Hrady, zámky a tvrze Království českého 13* [Castles, Manors and Strongholds of the Bohemian Kingdom 13], Praha, Argo, pp. 102–103.

⁷³ In Nuremberg on 11 March 1474, Frederick III concluded with King Wladyslaw a union against Matthias Corvinus – *Regesten Kaiser Friedrichs III.*, Heft 27, (2012). S. Dünnebeil – D. Luger (Eds.) Böhlau-Wien-Weimar-Köln, Nr. 226 and on 13 March the emperor then concluded a similar agreement also with his father Casimir. The Polish king promised to deploy the army against Corvinus on the Feast of St John the Baptist (24 June) and to personally stay with the army at least until (25 July). On the emperor's position towards Matthias's efforts for the Bohemian throne, see Krieger, K. F. (1994), *Die Habsburger im*

of the Polish court, the emperor on September 17, 1474 in a letter from Augsburg called on “dear loyal to us and the Empire” Zdeněk of Šternberk, Jan of Házmburk, Jan of Hradec, Bohuslav of Šternberk, Jindřich the Younger of Plavno, Děpolt of Rýmberk and Dobrohost of Ronšperk to in the interest of the Empire subject themselves to the elected and coronated King Vladislaus in the Bohemian Crown, which is the most important Electorate.⁷⁴ He failed, the lords for the moment dared to openly fall to Corvinus.

In the autumn, the war of the so-called three kings broke out, which meant a situation for members of the League of Zelená Hora in which they had not yet been. Since 1471 they had been at war with Casimir’s son Vladislaus, but except for partial clashes over castles, it was a rather formal war, moreover interrupted by repeated ceasefires, but now it meant being at war with the Polish king, with a man whose diplomatic mission in 1467 had saved it from military catastrophe. The lords of The League of Zelená Hora still tried to avert the war at the last minute and negotiate a new truce. Šternberk again provided Polna for the negotiations with the representatives of Vladislaus’s party. They did not dare to accept the proposal of his diplomats that the League leave Corvinus and recognise the young Jagiellonian as their king, and he would not accept their demand for maintaining a ceasefire. When the negotiations failed, the leaders of the League had no option but to again bet on Matthias Corvinus. Šternberk and another four more closely unnamed representatives of the league accompanied by military troops joined his army at Nysa in Silesia.⁷⁵

In September 1474 Zdeněk of Šternberk appeared as Corvinus’s envoy before the Polish king at his camp near Czenstochowa. For the first time since the Głogów congress, he stood face to face with the man, whom he had called in letters and the mouths of his emissaries to the throne in 1467.⁷⁶ Zdeněk, in the times of King

Mittelalter: Von Rudolf I. bis Friedrich III., Stuttgart–Berlin–Köln, pp. 183–192. Koller, H. (2005). *Kaiser Friedrich III.*, Darmstadt 2005, p. 211; Nehring, K. (1975), Matthias Corvinus, p. 57.

⁷⁴ The emperor’s Augsburg call – copy of the letter at SOkA Cheb, AM Cheb, kartón 4, fasc. 4 B 70/26, in an edition *Regesten Kaiser Friedrichs III.* Heft 26, (2012), p. 297, Nr. 676 and *Urkundliche Nachträge zur österreichisch-deutschen Geschichte im Zeitalter Friedrich III* (1892), p. 283, Nr. 266.

⁷⁵ The attempt for a ceasefire in Polná, Šternberk in Nysa – *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau.* Bd.2. (2003), p. 943 – Palacký, F. (1921), *Dějiny národu českého*, p. 1048.

⁷⁶ On the negotiations at Czeštochowa, see *Peter Eschenloer. Geschichte der Stadt Breslau.* Bd.2. (2003), p. 946 and *Joannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae inclicti regni Poloniae* (2006), p. 353. From the literature on that, see Baczkowski, (1982). *Walka*, p. 104 and 108. Palacký, F. (1921) *Dějiny národu českého*, p. 946.

George a fanatic supporter of war, now proposed peace. However, it is still a question whether Corvinus's envoys really submitted a proposal at the time that their lord would give up the Czech lands if Casimir IV was willing to give him his daughter as his wife. This would mean that Šternberk and his companions would be handed over to King Vladislaus and, paradoxically, the plan of the League from 1467 would be fulfilled. Nevertheless, the proposal for Corvinus's marriage to Princess Hedwig was undoubtedly presented. When Corvinus's Bohemian envoys failed, they proposed at least an extension of the armistice once agreed in Opava, but Casimir IV rejected even that.

The leaders of the League of Zelená Hora took advantage of the course of the war, in which the combined Bohemian-Polish Jagiellonian army gradually completely wasted its overwhelming numerical superiority, and offered themselves in the role of intermediaries.⁷⁷

How paradoxically things had turned around! In 1467, the representatives of the Polish king brokered an armistice between the League of Zelená Hora and King George, now it was the League who sought to take on the role of mediators between Corvinus and the Jagiellonians. And relatively successfully. Although the League of Zelená Hora did not appear as a specific entity in the proposal for an armistice, its leader Zdeněk of Šternberk was explicitly mentioned in the concluded peace agreement.⁷⁸ The result of the war was a great success for Corvinus under the given balance of power, but it benefited the Bohemian Catholics even more.

The League of Zelená Hora observed the subsequent three-year ceasefire; after all, it contributed to their own interests.⁷⁹ Paradoxically, at its end, the League

⁷⁷ Peter Eschenloer: *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd. 2. (2003), p. 971. *Scriptores rerum silesiacarum*. Bd. 13, *Politische Correspondenz Breslaus im Zeitalter des Königs Matthias Corvinus*, 1. Abt. 1469–1479, pp. 166–175, č. 217. Grünhagen, C. (*Geschichte Schlesiens I*, pp. 336 and 337). The Polish military campaign in Silesia was evaluated quite critically by K. Baczkowski, K. (1985). *Walka Jagiellonów z Maciejem Korwinem o koronę czeską w latach 1471–1479*, Kraków, pp. 107–121. Kalous, A. Matyáš Korvín, pp. 151–152. Surprisingly briefly on the war of the three kings are Dušan Uhlíř et al., (2012), *Slezsko v dějinách českého státu I* [Silesia in the History of the Bohemian State I], Praha, Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, p. 397. They reduced the strength of the Polish army here to a mere five number listed in the earlier literature.

⁷⁸ The text of the peace agreement is presented by Peter Eschenloer: *Geschichte der Stadt Breslau*. Bd.2. (2003), pp. 963–972, Zdeněk on p. 966, Article 8, and p. 968, Nr. 15.

⁷⁹ Corvin respected the Wrocław Contract, subsequently the Prague and Brno Agreements, but refused to ratify them with a call to the necessity for papal consent – see Tomek, V. V. (1879). *Dějepis města Prahy VII*, Praha, pp. 329–331, 340 and 343. In fact, they were, however, observed. On the overall assessment of the effort of “part of the realistically thinking Catholic estate” to find a form of peaceful coexistence with Wladyslaw's party, see Macek, J. (2001). *Jagellonský věk v českých zemích 2.*, Praha, Academia, p. 366.

ended up in a private war not with King Vladislaus, but with its former protector, Emperor Frederick III. Zdeněk from Šternberk did not live to see its end.⁸⁰

His successor at the head of the League Bohuslav of Švamberk tried to defend his right to independent action against Corvinus. Despite the king's instructions, he concluded a peace with the emperor and opposed the new deployment of Hungarian garrisons in southern and western Bohemia. He was therefore lured to a meeting in České Budějovice, captured and taken to a Hungarian prison.⁸¹ Cheb soon joined the side of Vladislaus and the majority of the lordly members of the League did not obey Corvinus's order to begin open war against the young Jagiellonian. Some already stood in clear opposition – Zdislav of Šternberk had clearly defied Mathias's commands, Jan of Švamberk and his uncle Hynek had already openly negotiated an alliance with King Vladislaus.⁸²

⁸⁰ For a copy of Švamberk's feud letter to the emperor, see SOA Třeboň, inv. Nr. 3574, sg. 2931. For information on when Šternberk started his battle against the emperor, see the letter of the reeve from Trhové Sviny to the burgrave of Krumlov from 24 September 1476 with the warning that Zdeněk of Šternberk was moving with his army to Austria and could cause significant damage in the township – *Archív český IX* (1889), p. 173, Nr. 818. Bohuslav of Švamberk was told of Zdeněk's death by Jindřich the Younger of Plavno, *ibid.*, inv. Nr. 3602 sg. 1957c. On the same see also Corvinus's letter to Jindřich of Rožmberk in *Archív český VI* (1872), p. 54, Nr. 14. On his death and deposition in the parish church of St Nicholas, see SOkA České Budějovice, AMČB, Liber memorabilium decanatus Budvicensus I, f. 127 b. On the overall assessment of Zdeněk's person, see Macek, J. (2001). *Jagellonský věk v českých zemích 2.*, pp. 366–368.

⁸¹ On 7 January 1478, King Matthias wrote to Bohuslav of Švamberk to reject the conciliatory solution with the emperor: „*Protož takovým přivoliti se nám nezdá a nehodí a ty k nim také nesvoluj*” [Therefore it does not seem to us to suit such and is not proper, and you do not agree to them either] – *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské VI* (1872), p. 58, Nr. 20. On the arrest of Bohuslav, see the letter of the Strakonice grand prior Jan from 1 February 1478, in which he expressed sadness over the arrest of his father to Hynek of Švamberk – SOA Třeboň, inv. Nr. 3731, sg. 3081. Corvinus accused the arrested Bohuslav of resistance to his orders and hindering him Hungarian armigers not only from entering his castles but also Budějovice and Pilsen. Bohuslav rejected the charges and also refused the demand that he pay 40,000 Hungarian guildens for his release – see Corvinus's letter to the member of the League of Zelená Hora Dobrohost of Ronšperk – „*A jakož nám píšeš o pána ze Švamberka, věz, že jsme ho nejali bez dobrých důvodů, jakož pak dnes jeho před soudem viniti máme a s ním se sūditi*” [And as you write to us about the lord of Švamberk, know that we did not arrest him without good reasons, just as today we are to blame him in court and to judge him.] – The writings of the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus in 1469 to 1487 published in the Czech language in AČ VI, p. 60, Nr. 22.

⁸² On the emperor's recognition of Wladyslaw Jagiellonian as the Bohemian king and elector of the Holy Roman Empire *Regesten Kaiser Friedrichs III.* Heft 23, (2007). P. J. Heinig (Ed.) Böhlau-Wien-Weimar-Köln, p. 380, Nr. 650 and the subsequent declaration of hostility on

The Peace of Olomouc brought the League an unexpectedly favourable result of the Jagiellonian war with Mathias Corvinus for the Bohemian Crown. Although Matthias gained all the affiliated lands, he could not establish himself in Bohemia and the whole kingdom fell to his Jagiellonian adversary.⁸³ The lords of the League of Zelená Hora were not punished for their eight-year resistance against the Jagiellonians, and the peace, on the contrary, returned all their lost castles. In September 1479, Jan Zajíc of Házmburk again met with Vladislaus Jagiellonian, but this time together with Jindřich of Hradec and Vok of Rožmberk he knelt as before his Bohemian king. The former lords of the League of Zelená Hora did not give up their political claims even under Vladislaus's reign; on the contrary, they regained their places at the land court, and some of them even became members of the royal council. What King George had denied them, they achieved with King Vladislaus. Paradoxically, the success of the Jagiellonian candidacy brought the fulfilment of most of their secular demands, with which they had once begun their resistance against George of Poděbrady.⁸⁴

the part of Matthias Corvinus, see *Magyar diplomáciai emlékek Mátyás király korából 1458–1490* [Hungarian diplomatic memorials from the time of King Matthias 1458–1490], 4 vols. (1877). Ed. I. Nagy – A. B. Nyáry (Eds.), p. 357, Nr. 245. K. Nehring, *Matthias Corvinus*, pp. 84–86. Opll, F. (1995). *Nachrichten aus dem mittelalterlichen Wien. Zeitgenossen berichten*, p. 206f. Bohuslav of Švamberk and Dobrohost of Ronšperk concluded a ceasefire with the supporters of King Wladyslaw Lev of Rožmitál, Beneš of Kolovraty and Jan of Roupov, see *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské V* (1862). F. Palacký (Ed.), Praha, pp. 373–374, Nr. 9.

⁸³ For the text of the Olomouc agreements, see *Lehns und Besitzurkunden Schlesiens und seiner einzelnen Fürstenthümer im Mittelalter I.* (1881). C. Grünhagen – H. Markgraf (Eds.), Leipzig, pp. 21–29. On the release of Matthias's subjects from their obligations, see *Archiv Koruny české VI*, p. 123.

⁸⁴ The minutes of the St Wenceslas Diet of 1479 in *Archiv český čili staré písemné památky české i moravské IV* (1846), pp. 496–502. From the literature, see Baczkowski, K. (1981). *Walka Jagiellonow*, p. 199. Macek, J. (2001). *Jagellonský věk v českých zemích 1.2.*, p. 330. Wladyslaw's royal council seated the following: Jindřich of Hradec, Jan Zajíc of Házmburk, Burian of Guštejna, Půta of Rýzmburk and at Švihov, Lihhart of Gutštejn, Jindřich of Plavno and Mareš of Švamberk.