The Far Right in Europe.

A summary of attempts to define the concept, analyze its identity, and compare the Western European and Central European far right.

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Abstract: This paper focuses on the far right with emphasis on summing up some of its more widespread definitions, evaluating the reasons for classifying it as a distinctive family of parties, and comparing of the Western European and (post-Communist) Central European far right. The text presents the theories of Piero Ignazi, Hans-Georg Betz, Cas Mudde, and other authors. The best working definition of the contemporary far right may be the four-element combination of nationalism, xenophobia, law and order, and welfare chauvinism proposed for the Western European environment by Cas Mudde. This concept allows for a basic ideological classification within a unified party family, despite the heterogeneity of the far right parties. Comparison of Central European far right parties with those of Western Europe shows that these four elements are present in Central Europe as well, though in a somewhat modified form, despite differing political, economic, and social influences.

Key words: Far right, Law and order, Nationalism, Silent counter-revolution, Welfare chauvinism, Western and Central Europe, Xenophobia

Introduction

The last decade of the 20th century was accompanied in a number of Western European countries by the rise of new formations referred to as the radical right, extreme right, right-wing populist, right-authoritarian, or new radical right. The themes that these parties have used to define themselves included criticism of immigration from the Third World, the ideas of multiculturalism, corruption among the traditional political elites and their inability to solve the problems of regular citizens, excessive tax burden, over-regulation by the state, and deepening of European integration. These have been closely accompanied by nationalism and moral traditionalism. However, individual parties have varied significantly in the emphasis placed on individual themes. These variations were magnified by organizational amorphousness related to the parties' presentation of themselves as movement-parties (Kitschelt 2006: 286).

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The rise of these parties naturally led to a boom in interest among political scientists. The research, however, was marked by very different ideas about these parties on the part of individual authors. The problem is very closely related to the differing conceptual approaches that have been developed in this area. It is precisely the issue of conceptualization that remains a broad topic of discussion and dispute today.

From this fact the first and basic goal of this text is derived: to summarize the basic approaches to the study of this political phenomenon. In view of its limited scope, this study will not be an exhaustive account, but rather a selective introduction of some of the most well-known concepts and an evaluation of them, as well as a critique of their broader applicability. The second goal of this text is to mull over the question of whether what the author gives the working label far right can be regarded as a distinctive party family. In other words, does today’s far right have a common identity? A third task is analysis of the similarities and differences between today's far right in Western and post-Communist Central Europe. This comparison naturally offers itself even though it has been nearly two decades since the fall of the Iron Curtain, and today’s Central Europe is now an integral part of the European Union.

**Historical excursion: Fascism and its influence on the far right**

In the first half of the 20th century the right extreme of the political spectrum was perhaps most closely associated with fascism. Its ideological foundations, however, were quite vague, often eclectically combined with the ideas of other ideologies. Its leading proponents were well aware of this. As Mussolini rationalized, “… Fascism differs from other programs in its spirit (...), which is based on war and victory” (O’Sullivan 1995: 195).

The authors analyzing fascism nonetheless agree on several general characteristics that are indicative of both branches of fascism, Italian and German (Fritzsche 1977: 470-473; O’Sullivan 1995: 137-188; Heywood 2004: 209-230; Feldman 2006: 455-459; Griffin 2006: 446). Fascism was typified by the negation of rationalism, progress, freedom, and equality, and generally everything connected to “the year 1789”. The exception was political activism, which became important for fascism. Fascism was also characterized by rejection of capitalism, liberalism, communism, democracy, and the parliamentary system; idealization of the nation, and struggle as the fundamental impulse of history. Also crucial were the application of the leadership principle and the cult of the leader, heroism, and corporatism functioning within the organic society. Organic society, in the view of the fascists, should be spiritually untied and ethnocentric, and its regime should be founded on a (fascist) movement.
This is connected to ideas about the creation of a “new man” cleansed of the decadent layers of the past, permanent revolution as the foundation of social dynamics, a messianic view of the world, projection of the state as the key unit superseding the interests of the individual, and an expression of national unity and national autarky. Also indispensable is the role of (variously understood) myth appearing for example in the Italian idea of completing risorgimento and in the German concept of belief in the necessity of struggle for regeneration of the Volksgemeinschaft. The German (national socialist) version of fascism differed from the Italian in its emphasis on race and the racial principle (division into “superior” and “inferior” races) and its antisemitism.

To view the far right primarily through the prism of fascism was current in political science long after the Second World War. It was still visible in the first half of the 1980s, when political scientist Klaus von Beyme in his classic work Parteien in westlichen Demokratien (German 1982, English 1985) was one of the first to outline the concept of party families. With the parties on the right end of the political spectrum, he could refer in the first place to fascism, in both its inter-war Italian and German forms, as well as in its various mutations and remnants influenced by national and period-specific conditions. These mutations and remnants were, of course, as von Beyme stated, often quite distant from the two main and, fundamentally in some aspects, divergent models. For example, in the context of Spain von Beyme (1985: 125, 127) wrote: “The Spanish movement was always a mixture of Fascist (Falange) and traditionalist elements with right-wing Syndicalist splinters. The party was only a hanger-on of the military movement under Franco. After the success of the military putsch the Fascists gained more support as the veteran organization (…) but to the sorrow of the old Falangists their Fascist ardour was checked.”

During the course of the next several decades after 1945, various neo-fascist groups were present on the political and social periphery in the democratic Western regimes. If they were legal at all, their electoral significance was negligible. The single isolated exception was the post-Mussolini Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social Movement).

Von Beyme also dealt in a limited way with the rise of new protest movement parties, whose relation to the broadly-understood fascist tradition was negligible, and could hardly be considered to have totalitarian tendencies or be taken as manifestations of neo-fascism. He discusses for example the Poujadism in France in the 1950s, which was based particularly on the defense of the “ordinary” self-employed, small business owners, and farmers against the big companies and the state bureaucracy, or both the two Progressive Parties in Denmark and Norway (the Fremskridtsparti and the Fremskrittspart) since the 1970s, when they primarily protested against excess taxation. Von Beyme (1985: 129) therefore speaks of the need for
a broader concept of right-wing extremism. In his classic work, however, there was no major new reexamination of the family of far-right parties, probably because of the severe fluctuation of their voter support, fluid character, and especially the minimal (at that time) political importance of these formations.

Factors in the rise of the far right in today’s Europe, and the problem of terminology

Since the 1960s many authors have pointed out the impact of the dynamic social and economic changes on the values and political orientation of voters. Especially well-known in this regard was the idea by Ronald Inglehart (1971 and 1990) of a “silent revolution” that brought, to simplify somewhat, a gradual post-materialist value change to a young, educated, and materially-secure generation, and contributed to the rise of ecological and other left-libertarian parties in the late 20th century.

In this context it is important for authors to take note that social and economic changes were also important for the far right and had a major effect in shaping it (see Ignazi 1992; Betz 1993; Norris 2005). They point out, however, the entirely different impact and effect of these changes on different groups of voters, especially the less-educated, and working people in industry or agriculture. Among these groups traditional values came into question. One of the first to take note of this was Piero Ignazi (1992). Contradicting Inglehart, he spoke of a “silent counter-revolution”. In his opinion the current expansion of the far right is a certain kind of social reaction within post-industrial societies. The global economy demands a much more mobile and flexible labor force. However, a large portion of society has had a difficult time adapting to the changes. They often found themselves in a marginalized position characterized by long-term unemployment, growing frustration and deprivation, and a longing for renewal of the previous “status quo” with its traditional relationships, ties, order, and harmony. Regarded as especially negative in this context is the influx of Third World asylum seekers and immigrants experienced by Western Europe in recent decades, which has “awakened” xenophobia and racism.

This creates a favorable environment for radical political forces and charismatic leaders who vow to overcome the growing atomization of society, reject post-materialism, and promise to quickly solve the problems of unemployment, immigration, criminality, and other demands of voters who feel threatened. It is no accident that of the traditional parties affected by the rise of the far right, the most damaged were the Social Democratic parties. Their working-class voters
are among those for whom adaptation to changing circumstances has been most difficult (see Kitschelt 1994).

Before we move on from a description of the factors in the rise of the far right to an analysis of the conceptual approaches to it, a terminological problem must be addressed. A vagueness of terms in labeling the family of parties (as mentioned in the introduction) has had significant conceptual consequences. Perhaps the most frequently appearing term in the work of the European continent’s non-Anglo-Saxon authors is that of the extreme right (Ignazi 1992; Mudde 2000a; Holsteyn 2001).

In Germany where, for historic reasons, research has been the most developed in Europe, researchers also commonly differentiate between extremism and radicalism (e.g. Backes, Jesse 1993). While the term extremism is associated with the complete rejection of liberal democracy, and antiparliamentary and anti-constitutional goals, a term with negative connotations, the terms radicalism and radical reflect are more a path of action which may or may not be anti-democratic. Sometimes, however, in the German environment the term radical right is perceived as a transitory category between the extreme and moderate (conservative, Christian democratic) right (cf. Mareš 2003: 21).

Within the American and the general Anglo-Saxon environment, the most common term is radical right (e.g. Ramet 1999; Griffin 2000; Norris 2005). But here it has a much broader and different meaning than in the German environment. It is influenced by the older tradition of American nativism (anti-immigration sentiment), populism, and hostility to central government combined with ultra-nationalism, anti-communism, Christian Fundamentalism, and militaristic orientation (Mudde 2000a: 12-13).

Political scientist Miroslav Mareš (2003: 33), in the context of the discussion over terminology, calls attention to one problem, namely the overuse of the term extremist in the media discourse, often by mainstream parties in order to deliberately de-legitimize groups with the “extreme” label. Mareš therefore proposes for extreme and radical formations the umbrella term far right, which is so far unburdened by media discourse. The author of this text sees this appellation as the best solution, and it will be preferred in this text.

**Conceptual approaches to the far right**

As mentioned above, Piero Ignazi (1992, 1995, 1996, 2003) proposed three criteria that far right, in his terminology extreme right, parties should fulfill. First, they must be located at the right end of the left-right continuum, with no party located more to the right. Second, it should
have an ideological link with Fascist mythology and principles. Third, it must express values, issues and policies rejecting (and de-legitimizing) the democratic system.

The first criterion is generally acceptable, although the question could be raised how to classify two or more parties in the same country that are both to the right of the moderate right. This could be solved by including them in the family of far right parties but pointing out the differences between them. Much more disputable is the second criterion in view of the fact that most of the parties classified as far right (let alone relevant political parties) do not display the attributes of fascism, which Ignazi himself recognizes. It is enough, he says, if these parties fulfill the first criterion, but also the third criterion; that is, it must be an anti-regime (anti-system) formation. In this context he refers to the traditional concept by Giovanni Sartori (1976) of an anti-system party, as opposition of principle to the political system as such.

On this basis Ignazi divides the far right into two groups. The first group consists of the no-longer-relevant and basically residual old traditional parties, which have at least minimal ties to fascism or its heritage. The second group consists of new post-industrial parties, which are more successful with the voters. In the first group he includes the non-parliamentary Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, National Democratic Party) and the Deutsche Volkunion (DVU, German People’s Union) or the British National Party (BNP); in the second the Front National (FN, National Front) in France, the Fremskrittsparti (Progress Party) in Norway, or the Dansk Folkeparti (DF, Danish People’s Party), which split off from the original Progressive Party in the 1990s and took its voters with it. Ignazi points to the possible transformation of identity of some of the parties, and cites as an example the Italian neo-fascist MSI. This formation changed its name in 1993 to the Alleanza nazionale (AN, National Alliance), broke away from the fascist tradition, and distanced itself significantly from its previous stance. Ignazi (2003: 200) therefore classified it as a part of the new post-industrial far right.

However, there is a question about some of the parties Ignazi labels as anti-system, his third criterion for membership in the party family. Take the examples of the Alleanza nazionale and the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ, Freedom Party). Both participated in the government for significant periods at the turn of the 21st century without trying to destroy the democratic regime. Despite their radical opinions, it can be doubted that either of these parties has an anti-democratic goal and is striving to de-legitimize the regime in the sense of Sartori’s opposition of principle. Ignazi (2003: 32) does maintain that far right parties often “display non-compatibility of aims and acceptability of behavior”. However, others such as Kurt Luther (2000) or Marco Tarchi (2003) reject this classification when analyzing the FPÖ and AN. They point out
the parties’ (similar) efforts at reform of the partitocratic arrangement in the two respective countries during the 1990s, but these efforts cannot be considered as an attempt to overthrow democracy. These authors even question the labeling of the Alleanza nazionale and Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs as extreme-right parties, and point out their closeness to the conservative (in the Italian case) or liberal (in Austria) parties.

As part of the general framework of the discussion it would be good to take into account the changed political context, which is significantly different from that prevailing during the Cold War when Sartori came out with the term anti-system party. During the era after the end of the Cold War a transformation took place in many of the formerly anti-systemic parties. This was a process experienced not only by the MSI in Italy but by a number of former Communist parties. Generally, the result has been that at least some of the far-right parties can be considered only as protest or anti-establishment parties (Schedler 1996: 118; Kubát 2007). Consequently, the attitude of far-right parties toward the liberal democratic regime may today range from the strict rejectionist to the merely critical of certain negative phenomena that are present workings of a number of contemporary democratic regimes (corruption, excessive intermingling of the political and economic spheres, etc.).

A less rigid and much broader definition of the far right than Ignazi’s is offered by Hans-Georg Betz (1993 a 2004). He uses term right-wing populist parties. According to Betz these parties radically oppose the current cultural and socio-political system in the Western democracies, but without directly attacking its foundations. They reject individual and social equality, and emphasize cultural or ethnic homogeneity in society, with a preference for “our own people” over “foreigners”; that is, for the most part, immigrants. This can easily slip into xenophobia. They often emphasize neo-liberal economics, claim to defend the “ordinary person” against the corrupt establishment and the organs of the state, emphasize “common sense” and law and order; they are anti-feminist, and regard themselves as defenders of traditional values. Organizationally they are often led by a popular or even charismatic figure (Jean-Marie Le Pen and the Front National, Pia Kjaersgaard and the Dansk Folkeparti etc.). They are highly centralized and hierarchically structured, use populism to get votes, and are able to make effective use of political marketing.

However, Betz’s approach is not so much an ideological definition as a description of their political style. In practice this makes the assumption of a common identity among these parties problematic, and limits the utility of Betz’s approach in constructing a far-right family of parties, although it must of course be considered a contribution to their general characterization.
Also relatively well-known is the concept popularized largely by Meindert Fennema and his colleagues (Fennema 1997; Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2000; Brug, Fennema 2003) that views the far right, or a large part of it, from the perspective of opposition to immigration. This is reflected in their use of the working term anti-immigrant parties. However, as demonstrated above, immigration does represent a very common theme on the far right, but for most of these parties this is not the one big issue. The above authors attempted to solve this problem by referring to immigration as a “super-issue”. However, their definition of anti-immigrant parties is too vague to fit within their basic definition of the far right party family; that is, that (1) they have attempted to mobilize votes on the basis of anti-immigrant sentiments, and (2) they are stigmatized by the mainstream political parties (Brug, Fennema, Tillie 2000: 83). One of the doubtful aspects of the first condition is that the strategy of mobilizing voters by calling for strict regulation of immigration has also begun to be used by some moderate (mainstream) right-wing parties, for example the Christian Democratic Appeal in the Netherlands, or the Christian-Social Union in Germany. The anti-immigrant appeal platform is not particular to any one group of parties (Strmiska 2001).

For the purposes of this paper it is nevertheless very interesting to follow the view of the cited authors as they track changes in the electoral base of the far-right parties they have defined as such. According to comparative research on seven right-wing parties in elections to the European Parliament in 1994, voter motivation was almost always a combination of pragmatic protest against immigration, and ideological voting, depending on the closeness of affiliation of voters to the given party, and their position on the left-right spectrum. Similar research on elections in 1999 shows a significant growth in the importance of ideological voting at the expense of protest against immigration, which applied to almost all of the electorally-successful far-right parties – Alleanza nazionale, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, Dansk Folkparti, and the Vlaams Blok (VB, Flemish Block) in Belgium. On the other hand, with the electorally less-successful Dutch Centrumdemocraten (CD, Centre Democrats) or the German Republikaner (Republicans) the dominance of protest voting continued (Brug, Fennema 2003: 68-69). At minimum, however, this indicates something the ideological structure of their voters’ opinions.

As another possible approach to defining the far right we will present the concept of Cas Mudde (2000a and 2000b), which can basically be called minimalist. According to Mudde, the common ideological foundation of the far right combines four elements: nationalism, xenophobia, law and order, and welfare chauvinism. Welfare chauvinism means that the state should guarantee that its social policies should work to the benefit of one’s “own people” and
one's own nation, and not for that of "foreigners". The far right prefers a strong state on social issues and questions of law and order, though economically it may be (at least rhetorically) neoliberal. Mudde also points out that the individual elements he presents may have different meanings in different parties. Another important point for the discussion of the anti-systemic far right is his conclusion based on a study of selected parties – the Republikaner and the DVU in Germany; and Vlaams Blok, Centrumdemocraten, and Centrumpartij’ 86 (CP’86, Centre Party’ 86) in the Netherlands. According to Mudde (2000a: 181) all five parties accepted democracy, including CP’86 and the DVU, which Ignazi classified with the traditional far right. This confirms the above thesis that for the present-day far right an anti-system orientation is not a necessary part of the profile.

But Mudde’s approach is likewise unable to make clear the exact boundaries of the far-right party family, which the author himself confesses. Even so, despite reservations over such matters as a minimalistic ideological definition of what constitutes the contemporary far right, in comparison with other concepts Mudde’s one is the most convincing. As a fundamental principle this concept can be of use in comparing the Western European and post-communist Central European far right.

**Characterization of the far right in Central Europe**

The situation in Central Europe after 1989 has led to differences in the profiles of the region’s far right groups. Perhaps the first thing that should be mentioned is the absence of immigration from the Third World, which had a significant effect on the rise of the far right family of parties in the western part of the continent. Anti-immigrant nationalism is almost nonexistent, or appears only as a fringe phenomenon. But a nearly-equivalent “substitute” has appeared in the form of the numerous traditional national resentments and animosities that existed in the region before the Communist era, both in relation to neighbors, as well as toward various minorities. In particular, nationalism influenced by history (and linked to xenophobia) became the most visible feature of the local far right. Its focus depended on specific national conditions. For example, the Czech Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa (SPR-RSC, Association for the Republic – Czechoslovak Republican Party) was hostile to the Sudeten Germans, Germany as a neighbor, and Gypsies. The Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP, Hungarian Justice and Life Party) used these resentments to push for repatriation of former Hungarian territory taken over by neighboring countries after the First World War, and to rail against the Gypsies. The Slovenská národná strana (SNS, Slovak National Party) denounced
Hungarians and Gypsies as well; the Slovinska nacionalna stranka (SNS, Slovenian National Party) demanded the creation of a “Greater Slovenia” including parts of Austria and Italy.

In Central Europe no silent counter-revolution against the wave of post-materialistic values took place. The reason is the immense predominance of a materialistic outlook in the various countries, all related to the economic transformation occurring in the 1990s. The negative social consequences of economic transformation strongly influenced the profile of the local far right (Ramet 1999: 3-28; Minkenberg 2002; 358-360; Norris 2005: 74-76). It often spoke of a socially-sustainable economic transformation, and criticized its negative effects. With some authors this has directly found its way into the terminology as “protest-transformational” populist parties (Mareš 2006). In practice, nevertheless, some factors in this anti-transformational vector often exhibited a certain similarity with the social-economic orientation of the Western Europe far left, especially with its emphasis on social welfare for “our own people” (at the expense of “outsiders” such as Gypsies). Seen in this way, the Central European phenomenon might be called an anti-transformation chauvinism.

As with the Western European far right, an emphasis on law and order is found in the Central European environment as well. But the right’s Central European roots are of a different nature, and are intertwined with the upheavals that shook the political systems in the region during the course of the switch to democracy, and uncertainly about the limit of what is and what is not permitted under the new conditions of freedom. A combination of the relatively weak state and these uncertainties, accompanied by a sharp rise in the crime rate and a population that felt threatened by these changes, became fertile ground for the growth of the far right.

The Central European far right was also typified by a strong anti-Communism, much more markedly than in Western Europe. This was naturally an attempt to take advantage of the negative reaction in society after 1989 to the long era of Communism and its devastating affects. The authenticity of this anti-communism, however, was in some cases called into doubt by the past history of the far right’s leaders (for example the chairman of the Czech SPR-RSC Miroslav Sládek was employed prior to 1989 as a press censor).

For the existence and success of the Central European far right – just as in Western Europe - the figure of the party leader was of great importance (Sdružení pro republiku - Republikánská strana Československa and Miroslav Sládek, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja and István Csurka, Slovenská národná strana and Ján Slota etc.). Another common characteristic of all these actors was fluctuating voter support, which reflected the vulnerability of their political position. The brief existences were made even shorter by internal conflicts ending with the secession of
dissatisfied members. Their usual reason was the authoritative methods of the party leader. In this sense the Central European far right was no different from that of Western Europe.

For the SPR-RSČ, as for the MIÉP or SNS in Slovakia and in Slovenia, another defining element was opposition to membership in military alliances, especially NATO. This was strongly influenced by the decades of Soviet hegemony, during which the Central European countries were left in a subordinate role. It was expressed in calls for neutrality and rejection of any kind of military pact (Hloušek 2002: 392-393; Benda 2002: 239-240; Mareš 2003: 209-210; Kopecék 2007: 438-442). In West Europe the issue of NATO was of much less importance for far right parties, though most did take a negative stance. By the late 20th century when these parties got started, the question had lost most of its historical explosiveness.

On the other hand, the Central European far right parties did not exhibit the prevailing hard Euroskepticism of the West European far right, which is based on the rejection of EU membership, and emphasizes national sovereignty. The far right in Central Europe has usually been cautious about entering the European Union, and conditioned it on a set of conditions (for example, special protection for economic sectors such as agriculture, prohibitions on purchase of real estate by members from the “old” EU member countries, etc.). Usually, however, joining the EU has not been strictly rejected (with perhaps the only exception being MIÉP). The rest can be classified as soft euroskeptics (Taggart, Szczerbiak 2002; Szczerbiak, Taggart 2004).

In this context it is necessary to add, however, that among the West European far right parties there are exceptions to the prevailing hard-Euroskeptic attitude toward European integration. Especially with parties that entertain ambitions of participating in government, whether they have made it in or not (such as A lleanza nazionale, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, and the Norwegian Fremskrittsparti), a tendency has been exhibited toward greater flexibility on questions of European integration (Sitter 2002). It is also important that (broadly defined) Euroskepticism is a matter that is found not only on the far right, but among conservative parties and the far left as well (Hooghe, Marks, Wilson 2002). Therefore it can hardly be regarded as a distinctive element defining the family of the far right, but appears rather as a minor phenomenon associated with the radical nationalist element of the party family.

Conclusion

To summarize the overview presented above, we may conclude that today’s European far right forms a relatively heterogeneous entity. There continue to exist significant differences not only between the Western European and Central European parties, but among the Western
European far right as well. Another problem is the fact that the mutual dividing line between the far right and the moderate (conservative) right is becoming ever harder to detect. This is the result of attempts by some of the far right parties to become more politically acceptable (and acceptable as part of a government coalition) and change their political profile; moreover, several of the themes of the far right such as strict regulation of immigration have been adopted by moderate right-wing parties.

Even so, it would seem possible to set a minimal ideological framework for the far right by using the concept of Cas Mudde, who presents a combination of four elements: nationalism, xenophobia, law and order and welfare chauvinism. This foundation is sufficient to be able to speak of a distinctive family of far-right parties. This does not exclude the idea that the family has a “hard core” (the French FN, British BNP, or the German NPD) and “soft cover” (the AN in Italy, FPÖ in Austria, the Progressive Party in Norway, or the Danish People’s Party). Another significant common characteristic of the family is the absence of the kind of anti-democratic orientation that was prevalent in the inter-war era.

A look at the far right in Central Europe reveals the various historical-political, social, and economic factors that strongly influenced their formation, while also leading to some significant deviations. Of these the most important may be the (evidently temporary) weakness or absence of anti-immigration sentiment. But if we look at the four fundamental elements of the family, we can find them in the Central European milieu in modified form. Perhaps the most significant modification is the presence of an anti-transformation chauvinism that fills the space formerly occupied by welfare chauvinism in regard to the social and economic situation. It can be assumed that as the Central European region gradually enters the post-transformation phase, the degree of convergence between the local far right and the Western European far right will continue.

**Literature**

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